Iraq in Transition: Vortex or Catalyst? Royal Institute of International Affairs (UK) Sept 2004 (*.pdf file) Published 09/01/04.
The report sketches out three possible scenarios. One is the fragmentation scenario, in which the country splits along regional and ethnic lines. Another is "holding together" scenario, which the report explains could also be called the "muddling through" scenario. The third is a regional remake scenario, which could happen along with one of the other two.
The "scenarios"
As with any neat summary of a complex, messy, dynamic situation, these are not clean-cut alternatives. The scenarios provide a way of describing the possible implications of likely developments over the next few months.
Breakup of Iraq still a possibility, with a three-way split among the Kurds, the Sunni Muslims and the Shi'a Muslims - partially religion-based and partially geography-based the most likely scenario in that case. One of the values of this paper is that it provides a look at how messy that could get.
The geographic split among those groups is far from neat and clean. Though Baghdad is primarily Sunni, there is a large Shi'a minority there, many of them supporters of the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Kirkuk in the north is also a very problematic case:
The oilfields are located in the predominantly Shi'a south and around Kirkuk, the city the Kirds want as their capital in the north. ...
For the Kurds, Kirkuk is, at it were, their Jerusalem and, just like Jerusalem, it is coveted by several competing peoples. The sizeable Turkmen population consider Kirkuk to be their own ancestral capital and have been competing ferociously with the Kurds for the rightto control the city’s newly established civil authorities. The legacy of Saddam Hussein is also a powerful factor. Recognizing the prominence of Kurds in the city, he introduced a nowinfamous policy of Arabization, expelling Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians from Kirkuk and repopulating the city with Arab Iraqis (and even some Palestinians). Since Saddam’s removal, the internally displaced of Kirkuk have been returning home en masse
, triggering violent skirmishes with Arab settlers.... Turkey also has it own proxy forces in place in the guise of the Turkmen Front.
The Turkmen are a non-Arab, non-Kurdish group with which Turkey identifies and sees itself as their protector.
The "regional remake" scenario refers to the ways in which the various major elements in Iraqi society will affect Iraq's geographic neighbors. The Kurds are perhaps the best known of these in the US right now. But the effect of the Shi'a in Iraq will also be very important. The Chatham House report notes that in the US, it is often assumed that Iran represents the leadership of Shi'a Muslims. But it notes, "Ayatollah Ali Sistani of Najaf [Iraq] remains one of the leading Marja' [religious authority] within Shi'ism, and is a far more powerful figure for the Shi'a masses than any comparable Ayatollah in Iran."
In many ways, the taken-for-granted assumptions that show up in this paper are as instructive as the arguments. For instance, in discussing the international effect of Iraqi Sunni resistance in particular with relation to the secular Arab nationalism that competes with a more Islamist (or "Islamacist") approach, they write:
Secular nationalism is both antithetical to and potentially a parallel force to Sunni Arab religious extremism, commonly associated with Al-Qaeda. Although the nationalists and the Sunni Islamists start from radically different positions, they meet on issues of importance to this scenario – anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism, anti-Shi’ism, pro-Iraqi and potentially anti-Kurdish nationalism. A seemingly unlikely alliance of the secular and the religious could occur in Iraq and both strands are focused on the confrontation there.
This situation is, of course, part of the assumption of US foreign policy in the 1980s that secular Arab nationalsim was an important competitor to Muslim religious extremism, particularly the Shi'a variety, and that it was in the American interestto use secular Arab forces to offset the power and appeal of the religious extremists. That was a big part of the logic behind supporting Saddam Hussein's Iraq against Iran in the Iraq-Iran War.
The second scenario, Holding Together (though I think Muddling Through is more appropriate) is a case in which Iraq holds together as a coherent nation, almost certainly with some kind of federal arrangement to allow some autonomy to the various regions. There could be different versions of this: a strong authoritarian state, a very weak central state (the "failed state" situation being a variant of this), or a model democracy. The latter is exceptionally unlikely.
The report argues, "Essentially this scenario represents the best the United States can hope for, and will require a trade-off between the level of control that the US is able to exercise in Iraq, the powers of the IIG [the current Iraqi Interim Government] and the involvement of the wider international community."
There's another of those implicit assumption. This prestigious British institute does not assume that this is a British problem, but rather an American one. The assumptions of this passage are also worth noting:
Ultimately, to sustain the ‘Holding Together’ scenario a compromise is needed, wherein the IIG (working with the US and UN) succumbs to Ayatollah Sistani’s democratic demands, the Kurds continue to enjoy autonomy and some sort of veto powers are devised to give reassurance to the Sunnis. Oil revenues must be a national resource, not subject to control by one or other group, and decisions about long-term energy development and involvement of the private sector would best wait until an elected government has the legitimacy to decide such matters.
For this to work the United States has to relinquish its aspirations to manage the political and economic restructuring of Iraq. This means avoiding the urge to control events in the name of efficiency and disappointing the hopes of some major US corporations to make a killing in the new Iraqi market. Formal international provision for transparentoversight of the disbursement of funds and contracts will be needed to counteract Iraqi suspicions of corruption and exploitation. (my emphasis)
The Chatham House report makes it clear that a tolerable version of the Holding Together/Muddling Through scenario would be a lucky outcome, and that the next few months are likely to determine if even that is feasible. The report also suggests that the following is a necessary approach in the coming weeks to give that outcome the maximum probablility:
To avoid fragmentation, a great deal of diplomacy and compromise will be necessary between Iraq’s component groups, the United States (and UK) and the UN. In other words, it requires power-sharing, whereby the United States no longer asserts overriding control, but operates instead in partnership with the transitional governments, the nascent Iraqi security forces, the UN electoral commission and other relevant bodies. The result will not be a neat and tidy chain of command and there will still be violence and opposition, but a heavy-handed US response to continuing resistance would only recruit more opponents.
Given the still-embryonic state of Iraqi security forces, and the virtual non-existence of the Iraqi army, this is a tall order. And, in fact, there have been recent statements suggesting that the US plans a major initiative after the US presidential election in Fallujah and perhaps other Iraqi cities effectively controlled by rebels at present. A "heavy-handed US response," in other words.
And even if a tolerable version of Muddling Through still looks like five months from now, that doesn't mean that the fighting is over for US troops:
The idea that the UN’s sanction of any government or UN involvement on the ground would calm the situation is unlikely as far as Islamist and other combative forces against the Coalition are concerned. Any UN forces are likely to be targeted as the UN itself is viewed by Islamists, as well as by many in the region, as a tool in the legitimization of US policy and interests. Any continued US, Coalition, Arab, Muslim or UN presence in Iraq will be seen as a legitimate target for Islamist forces. (my emphasis)
The implication of of all this is not hard to summarize: the grand goals of setting up a model pro-American government in Iraq are notgoing to be achieved at anything like the current level of US military and political ("nation-building") effort. The best the US is looking at now is a reasonable stable Iraq with which the US can deal as a normal state, rather than an overtly hostile one.
Or, to put it another way, somthing like Nixon's notion of "peace with honor" in the Vietnam War is what we're looking at for the best-case scenario for the outcome of the Iraq War.
Iraq's Neighbors
The "scenarios" section of this report has, fortunately, attracted a bit of press and blogger attention. But in many ways, the parts about the stands of other countries in the region in relation to the various possible outcomes in Iraq is even more revealing.
Given the Bush administration threats against Iran recently, I found that one the most interesting of all: "Iran arguably gained most from the invasion of Iraq, which left it in a position of increased geopolitical strength." That's worth quoting a second time:
Iran arguably gained most from the invasion of Iraq, which left it in a position of increased geopolitical strength.
The report explains that the position of the Iranian reformers has weakened considerably over the last year, with the conservatives gaining renewed influence, with a less optimistic accomodating policy toward America. The effect of Bush administration policy of this development is described in an understated but clear way:
It is widely accepted that the reform movement as defined by the presidency of Mohammad Khatami has come to an end, but few observers are fully cognizant of the international dimensions of this failure. One of Khatami’s unassailable achievements had been his ability to communicate with the West and to attempt to remove the ‘wall of mistrust’. This singular asset was, however, dealt a fatal blow by President Bush’s decision in January 2002 to classify Iran as part of an ‘axis of evil’. Having assisted the coalition in their war in Afghanistan, many Iranians considered this unjustified, but more damagingly it provided the opportunity for Khatami’s opponents to argue that the Iranian President was as inept abroad as he had been at home. In effect it marked the beginningof the end of the dominance of the notion of constructive engagement with the West. The politics of distrust returned.
The report's authors believe that the impressive American conventional military victory over Iraq in 2003 contributed to a more accomodating standoff on the nuclear proliferation issue. This was one of the claimed longer-term benefits of the Iraq invasion, to scare other "rogue states" into doing what the US wanted them to do, especially on terrorism and nuclear weapons. But they also argue that his effect didn't last long:
Very soon, however, it became apparent that the United States would not be in any position to launch a serious military operation against Iran, and that on the contrary, Iranian assistance (or acquiescence) was being courted in order to stabilize Iraq. So having secured their position domestically, Iranian conservatives found themselves facing an enviable situation in their ‘near-abroad’, with unprecedented opportunities for the extension of Iranian influence. (my emphasis)
They argue that most Iranians prefer to see a unified Iraq with a relatively weak central government. So Iranians, they argue, would prefer a more dire scenario in Iraq, the most dire being the "fragmentation scenario" with a civil war. This would be expected to keep the US even more preoccupied in Iraq andforestall credible military threats against Iran.
In one of those telling, matter-of-fact statements in the report, it comments on the different attitudes of the conservatives and reformers in Iran toward a genuine democracy in Iraq. "Few in Iran believe this is a realistic outcome, however."
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the authors argue that Al Qaeda would prefer to see the "fragmentation scenario" come about, above all because it would maximize their potential to attack Saudi Arabia:
Iraq’s fragmentation is the worst scenario for the Saudi royal family. Conversely, it is the one Al-Qaeda and other violent jihadis desire most of all.
The current of Al-Qaeda runs two ways: into Iraq as Saudi jihadis cross the border, and into Saudi Arabia with the flow of arms from Iraq’s vast reservoir. Indeed, the price of arms is dropping fast on the black market. In alllikelihood, SaudiArabia will be contaminated with jihadis in the same way as Afghanistan. Bin Laden’s ideological children are returning to his homeland.
They cite Michael Moore's film Fahrenheit 9/11 by name as helping to create a more negative climate of public opinion against the Saudi royal family in the United States. However, they argue that the House of Saud views the threat of a newly empowered Shi'a Islam as the greatest threat arising from the Iraq "quagmire" (a term the repoort uses). Saudi Arabia has a substantial Shi'a minority population, heavily concentrated in the oil-rich areas of the desert kingdom.Syria, in their view, would prefer to see a unified Iraq. But Syrian leaders may also view a quick establishment of security and peace in Iraq as undesirable:
However, if Iraq holds together, this will signify the success of the US project and demonstrate that regime change is not only possible but also beneficial for people in the region. It will show that the end had justified the means and that leaders and regimes are expendable, something that Syria would rather not acknowledge.
The Chatham House report observes that the conquest of Iraq by the US has not, so far, opened the way for negotiating an Israeli-Palestinian peace. While a stable and democratic Iraq may provide a friendly diplomatic environment for Israel in the Middle East, a more authoritarian result could produce a "rise of religious nationalism [in Iraq] in which there will be fierce competition for anti-Zionist rhetoric." It's also not clear to me, given the rhetoric of many of the leading political actors in Iraq, that a representative and democratic Iraqi government would necessarily be friendly to Israel.
Turkey has serious concerns about the level of independence of the Kurks in Iraq, especially if it means that Turkish Kurds become more restive. Turkey wanted to see the Americans (with Turkish assistance) suppress the Kurdish guerrilla group PKK, which has not occurred. And they are concerned, as mentioned above, with the status of the Turkmen in the Kirkuk area.
However, the authors believe that the benefits of future memembership in the European Union (EU) has made Turkey more willing to accomodate thenotion of some kind of independent Kurdistan in Iraq, though that would not be their preferred outcome there:
[T]he common expectation that Turkey will immediately intervene militarily if the fragmentation scenario prevails is overdrawn. Two other conditions must be present for such a development. Turkey’s EU aspirations must have been dashed by the EU in December 2004 – which they would be if the Council decides not to start accession negotiations. Such a decision will fan the flames of anti-Western nationalism. The second condition would be the absorption of Kirkuk by the Kurds, putting Turkmen rights in jeopardy.
Turkey would only accept the continuation of the current special status of Kirkuk if fragmentation falls short of breaking up the country completely. Judging by recent dialogue between the Kurdish and Turkish authorities, the Kurds themselves understand how much they would need a friendly Turkey, particularly if fragmentation is truly looming. Turkey is their opening to the world and their lifeline, in ways that a much more self-interested Iran would not be.
Reports like this are helpful, because they allow the reader to get a look at current prospects in Iraq without being nearly so overshadowed by the kind of electoral posturing we see in much of the commentary from the Big Pundits in the US. Neither Bush nor Kerry is likely to publicly express such a bleak view of the Iraq War during this presidential campaign.
But one thing this report drives home is that during the next five months, in which Bush will be calling the shots even if Kerry wins the election, a deterioration of the situation in Iraq could radically reduce the prospects for even a moderately positive outcome for the US.
Getting an optimum result will require competent management of the situation and "sensitivity" to the many risks involved. Competence has not been a hallmark of the Bush administration. And we know what they think of "sensitivity."
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