Iraq War fans have been particularly harsh against Scott Ritter, former leader of the UN weapons inspection team in Iraq, for opposing their splendid little war in Mesopotamia.
Ritter was the leader of the team that in 1998 was "kicked out by Saddam," as is so often said. In fact, Ritter made the decision to pull the team out on his own authority when the Iraqi regime started blocking access to certain sites on the grounds that the team was being used by the CIA to spy on Iraq's facilities. And, in fact, that was true, as the US government later admitted. We also know now that it was one of the few direct sources of intelligence that the CIA had in Iraq.
Ritter makes no bones about the fact that he thinks Bush's decision to invade Iraq was a bad one. In his 2003 book Frontier Justice, Ritter called on the image of the frontier lynch mob to describe Bush's actions:
The truth of the matter is that the Bush administration has lied about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and the Iraqi links to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. The Bush administration worked the lynch mob up into a murderous frenzy by fabricating evidence and misrepresenting facts. In laying to the American people, the United States Congress, and the international community, the Bush admnistration has demonstrated flagrant disregard for the rule of law and the very virtues of American society. As a result of this perfidy, we Americans face a critical moment in our nation's history. How we as a people respond will dictate how we are governed, and how we interact with the rest of the world, for years to come. Do we challenge the Bush administration's brazen violation of the law, holding those elected to higher office accountable for what they have done in our name, and as such preserving the concepts, values, and ideals inherent in a democratic republic? Or do we endose the vigilante actions of Rancher Bush's west Texas lynch mob, turning a blind eye to the criminal actions of a man, and an administration, that have protected themselves with a bodyguard of lies?
In a recent article, Ritter sheds some light on who the leaders of the Iraqi resistance are likely to be. It's one more sign of the way the Bush administration and the Pentagon are trying to manage this war, and the incredible laziness andlack of responsibility of the press, that the Iraqi resistance is still presented as a faceless, inexplicable force of vaguely described "terrorists." The adminstration finds it more convenient to highlight the actions of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the jihadist who is often described with some imagination as part of al-Qaeda.
Ritter has some more specific ideas about the leadership:
Scott Ritter, Saddam's People Are Winning the War International Herald Tribune 07/22/04 (also available at CommonDreams.org.)
Ritter's picture of the prospects for success in the Iraq War are considerably darker than that expressed by Democratic vice presidential candiate John Edwards in his acceptance speech last week, when he said of Iraq, "we'll win this war."
Ritter writes, "As things stand, it appears that victory will go to the side most in tune with the reality of the Iraqi society of today: the leaders of the anti-U.S. resistance." And he presents a more informed and nuanced picture of Saddam's strategy than we often hear.
Saddam's Baathist regime was indeed a secular regime. And whatever regime replaces it is likely to have a more pronounced Islamic religious character. After the Gulf War of 1991, Saddam began to emphasize Islamic ideology more than ever before, not least in order to give Iraqi military officials the ability to work with Islamic resistance groups. And the lack of understanding of this process by American decision-makers has had major implications for the occupation and counterinsurgency efforts:
The Pentagon today speaks of a "marriage of convenience" between Islamic fundamentalists and former members of Saddam's Baathist regime, even speculating that the Islamists are taking over Baathist cells weakened by American anti-insurgency efforts.
Once again, the Pentagon has it wrong. U.S. policy in Iraq is still unable or unwilling to face the reality of the enemy on the ground.
The Iraqi resistance is no emerging "marriage of convenience," but rather a product of years of planning. Rather than being absorbed by a larger Islamist movement, Saddam's former lieutenants are calling the shots in Iraq, having co-opted the Islamic fundamentalists years ago, with or without their knowledge.
He names former Iraqi Vice President Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, his former deputy Rafi Tilfah, Hani al-Tilfah, and Tahir Habbush as former officials that are likely to be key players in organizing and directing the resistance, including Islamic militants. Habbush headed the Iraqi Intelligence Service that worked for months prior to the Iraq War on developing partisan warfare tactics like those we see in operation today in Iraq. Hani al-Tilfah was the head of an intelligence agency called the Special Security Organization, with which Ritter and his inspection team dealt directly. Ritter believes that his is operating today with many of his former officers in the resistance.
His view is that the current "transition" government is so dependent on former exile politicians with so little internal support in Iraq that the guerrillas, drawing heavily on members of the former regime that may not be generally popular in Iraq but have solid constituencies to support and hide them, that the prospects for success are very poor. "There is no elegant solution to our Iraqi debacle, says Ritter. "It is no longer a question of winning but rather of mitigating defeat."
Ritter's view seems to be much more realistic than John Edwards' optimism or the delusions of Bush and Cheney.
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