...[T]he strategic opportunity of the operation was to knock out Al Qaeda. The correct aim should have been to deliver a knockout blow against the terrorist network, not just against the supporting state. We missed our chance when enemy forces were able to scurry into the surrounding. Al Qaeda had been scattered - not destroyed. It might never again be so easily targetable.
Then the focus shifted quickly toward preparing a conventional war against Iraq. Although Iraq's threat as a state sponsor of terrorism was emphasized in the buildup to war, above all the threat that its (non-existent) "weapons of mass destruction" might be given to terrorists groups to use against the US, it's questionable based on what we know now how seriously the Bush Administration itself took those claims.
As the Iraq War pressed their case, Clark heard from one military officer a joke making the rounds at the Pentagon: "That if Saddam didn't do it [i.e., 9/11], too bad, he should have, because we're going to get him anyway." Clark reflects on his reaction to this notion:
I looked at him as he spoke. We both knew that all this would distract us in the fight against Al Qaeda: first, the time demands on the military and intelligence leadership themselves - every hour spent planning operations against Saddam would have been used against Al Qaeda. Second, consider the intelligence collection systems: imagery, electronic intercepts, linguists, and agent networks surely would be more productive if not focused on collecting the tactical and targeting information against Saddam. Next consider the resources issue: Would we not have more financial resources to spend on military and homeland security needs if we were not simmultaneously going after Iraq?
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