As the Bush Administration continues to commit troops to foreign conflicts, the questions become more urgent. In Haiti, did the United States instigate the opposition to the elected government? Did the Bush Administration back a coup?
Now US Marines are on the ground, but armed rebels are still operating in the countryside. This passage in an article by Jim Lobe caught my eye (Role in Haiti Events Backfiring on Washington 03/12/04, my emphasis):
Florida Democratic Sen Bob Graham charged that the Bush administration was pursuing ''an Afghanistan solution'' by concentrating Marines in the capital ''with everyone else in the country pretty much naked.'' He and Ohio Republican Sen Mike DeWine both criticized the administration for not sending in more troops to stabilize the situation.
Intervention does have its own pragmatic logic. We've sent in the Marines. But there aren't enough of them to stabilize the entire country and to facilitate democratic nation-building. So what do we do? Do we make do with what we have? Do we say, well, we can't accomplish what we need to with this number of troops, so we'll pull out and let someone else worry about it?
But then, what does that do to our international credibility as an ally and a potential opponent?
On the other hand, given that the armed forces are already overstretched, does an expanded intervention in Haiti make sense? What is our national interest in having troops in Haiti? What are our goals there? How will we know when we've "won"? And how does that fit in with our priorities in the Iraq War and the Afghan War?
Given my own suspicion of the motives and competence of Bush's foreign policy team, I have no enthusiasm for the Haiti intervention. But now that we've intervened directly in the situation, our actions or lack thereof will have consequences, for Haiti and for the United States. And we may be in another of those situations where there's no "right" way to approach it. Just some ways that are less problematic than others.
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