"I think we are winning. Okay? I think we're definitely winning. I think we've been winning for some time." - Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Iraq War 04/26/05
"I just wonder if they will ever tell us the truth." - Harold Casey, Louisville, KY, October 2004.
This article makes an observation about the making of IEDs (Improvised explosive devices) that give some important information about the nature of the insurgency in Iraq: Iraq: Social Context of IEDs by Montgomery McFate Military Review May-June 2005 (*.pdf file).
The IEDs that are killing Americans in Iraq were not imported from abroad. Saddam Hussein’s regime designed them. The insurgency’s expert bombmakers are mostly former members of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), the Mukhabarat. The IIS unit called M-21 (also known as the Al Ghafiqi Project) operated a laboratory that designed IEDs. Bomb manufacturing at M-21 was a collaborative enterprise: “No one person constructed an entire explosive device alone. ... An improvised explosive device began in the chemistry department which developed the explosive materials for the device.The electronics department prepared the timers and wiring of the IED and the mechanical department produced the igniters and designed the IED." [from the CIA's "Duelfer report"] M-21 designed a number of clever ways to conceal explosives, including in books, briefcases, belts, vests, drink containers, car seats, floor mats, and facial issue boxes. M-21 also produced manuals on how to conduct roadside ambushes using IEDs; how to construct IEDs from conventional high explosives and military munitions; and how to most effectively take out a convoy by disguising an IED. The IIS M-21 unit is a key reason the Iraqi insurgency is so adept at constructing IEDs. They provided "the blueprints of the postwar insurgency that the U.S. now faces in Iraq." [Scott Ritter]
This assessment suggests that Steve Ritter was on the right track - Ritter is even quoted directly - when he wrote in an article I quoted here last summer:
The Pentagon today speaks of a "marriage of convenience" between Islamic fundamentalists and former members of Saddam's Baathist regime, even speculating that the Islamists are taking over Baathist cells weakened by American anti-insurgency efforts.
Once again, the Pentagon has it wrong. U.S. policy in Iraq is still unable or unwilling to face the reality of the enemy on the ground.
The Iraqi resistance is no emerging "marriage of convenience," but rather a product of years of planning. Rather than being absorbed by a larger Islamist movement, Saddam's former lieutenants are calling the shots in Iraq, having co-opted the Islamic fundamentalists years ago, with or without their knowledge.
He named former Iraqi Vice President Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, his former deputy Rafi Tilfah, Hani al-Tilfah, and Tahir Habbush as former officials that were likely to be key players in organizing and directing the resistance, including Islamic militants. Habbush headed the Iraqi Intelligence Service that worked for months prior to the Iraq War on developing partisan warfare tactics like those we see in operation today in Iraq. Hani al-Tilfah was the head of an intelligence agency called the Special Security Organization, with which Ritter and his UN weapons inspection team dealt directly. Ritter wrote that he believed Hani al-Tilfah was still operating in Iraq with many of his former officers in the resistance.
In other words, Saddam's regime had planned for a protracted guerrilla war such as the one we're seeing now. Ritter wrote:
[Saddam] order[ed in 1995] that all senior Baath Party officials undergo mandatory Koranic studies. For Saddam, this radical shift in strategy was necessary to his survival, given the new realities of post-Gulf War Iraq.
The traditional Baathist ideology, based on Iraq-centric Arab nationalism, was no longer the driving force it had been a decade prior. Creating a new power base required bringing into the fold not only the Shiite majority - which had revolted against him in the spring of 1991 - but also accommodating the growing religious fundamentalism of traditional allies such as key Sunni tribes in western Iraq.
The most visible symbol of Saddam's decision to embrace Islam was his order to add the words "God Is Great" to the Iraqi flag.
The transformation of the political dynamics inside Iraq, however, went largely unnoticed in the West. It certainly seems to have escaped the attention of the Bush administration. And the recent "transfer of sovereignty" to Allawi's government reflects this lack of understanding. (my emphasis)
It continues to surprise me that we don't see more informed discussion about who the resistance is in Iraq. Most of the discussions that we see and hear about it turn around some ideological or propaganda point on what role Syria or "foreign fighters" or "anti-Iraq forces" play.
McFate's article is focused on the practical counterinsurgency task of using what is known about the makers of the bombs to penetrate the resistance groups. He assumes that there is some degree of central coordination in the making of IEDs. That means that killing or capturing the expert bombmakers can deprive the resistance of technical expertise that can't immediately be replaced. And he observes that such a specialization of function in the preparation of the IEDs:
... specialization of function makes those who plan, transport, and detonate bombs dependent on those who build them. Although the insurgency is organized in cells, multiple members of each cell must know the identity of the bombmaker in order to retain access if cell members are killed. Thus, multiple “customers ” within the network know the bombmaker’s identity.
And McFate gives us this general sketch of the resistance:
British military sources have confirmed that the insurgency is composed of highly organized cells operating in small numbers. Typically, each cell has a variety of members who specialized in different tasks. For example, one group of insurgents consisted of two leaders, four subleaders, and 30 members. Broken down by activity, there was a pair of financiers; two cells of car-bomb builders; an assassin; mortar and rocket launching teams; and others in charge of roadside bombs and ambushes. Members of insurgent cells operate part-time and blend back into the civilian population when operations are complete.
While some foreign fighters might be present, the majority of insurgents are native Iraqis connected to each other and to the general population by social networks and relationships. The most important social network in Iraq is the tribe. Most Iraqis are members of one of 150 major tribes, which are subdivided into about 2,000 smaller clans. The largest clans contain more than one million people; the smallest, a few thousand. (my emphasis)
And he describes how social network analysis (SNA) is used in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq:
SNA resources, such as those under development at the Office of Naval Research, identify how to maximally disrupt a network by intervening with the key players and how to maximally spread ideas,misinformation,and materials by seeding key players. By using data about IIS members and their personal relationships within the Iraqi tribal network, SNA can describe terrorist networks, anticipate their actions, predict their targets, and deny the insurgents the ability to act.
McFate also suggests that bribery to tribal sheiks is a promising method of locating insurgents and weaponry. He emphasizes how well-supplied the resistance is with explosives, quoting an Iraqi official specializing in defusing IEDs saying, "One of the coalition ’s fatal mistakes was to allow the terrorists into army storerooms. ... The terrorists took all the explosives they would ever need."
Finally, the following observation is hardly unique. But it's worth remembering, given the highly ideological way in which Iraqi politics is discussed in the US. Support for the insurgents doesn't equate to being eager to vote for their leaders in an election:
The insurgency seeks two kinds of support from the civilian population: active and passive. Civilians provide active support when they transport, emplace, and detonate bombs. Insurgents gain civilian cooperation through coercion,threats, and financial remuneration. Civilians provide passive support by allowing insurgents to escape and “disappear ” among the general population. In this, the insurgency has an advantage, because officials from the remnants of Saddam ’s intelligence and security services know who is loyal, where they live, and with whom they associate.
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