Tuesday, December 6, 2005

Iraq War: No retreat, no surrender? (And no negotiations?)

Gareth Porter argues that by ruling out any kind of timetable for phased withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, the Bush administration could be missing an opportunity to negotiate a peaceful exit and undercut the foreign jihadist fighters in Iraq: Bush Policy Rules Out a Deal on Zarqawi by Gareth Porter, Inter Press Service 12/05/05. (Also at Antiwar.com.)

Porter observes:

At the recent Iraqi reconciliation meeting in Cairo, leaders of three Sunni armed organisations - the Islamic Army, the Bloc of Holy Warriors and the Revolution of 1920 Brigades - told U.S. and Arab officials they were willing to track down terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and turn him over to Iraqi authorities as part of a negotiated settlement with the United States, according to the highly respected London-based Arabic-language Al-Hayat newspaper.

He mentions that some of the Sunni guerrilla groups began making offers of negotiations in early 2005.

And there is also reason to believe that meaningful negotiations are a real possibility.  As Porter explains:

In July, Marine Lt. Gen. James T. Conway told reporters in Washington that the military had identified the top eight to 10 leaders of the insurgency and knew that they had met "occasionally" to "talk organisation tactics". Some of those meetings are said to have taken place in Syria and Jordan.

After meetings between the insurgent leaders and U.S. military officers, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. George Casey, said that the "preliminary talks" could lead to actual negotiations with insurgent groups.

The Iraqi nationalists among the Sunnis have good reason to want to get rid of the foreign jihadist groups.  But as long as no prospect of a negotiated peace is available, the Sunni insurgents have a pragmatic needs to cooperate with them at some level.  Porter writes:

In the past, both the Sunni insurgents and Zarqawi's followers have raised the possibility that the Sunni leaders would turn on the foreign jihadists if a peace agreement were reached with the United States. Last August, Saleh al-Mutlaq of the Sunni National Dialogue Council, which is sympathetic to the Sunni armed resistance, declared, "If the Americans reach an agreement with the local resistance, there won't be any room for foreign fighters."

After the reports of contacts between the Sunni insurgents and U.S. officials surfaced last summer, the al Qaeda organisation in Iraq expressed serious concern about just such a possibility. An internet posting by a follower of Zarqawi warned that if the Sunni insurgents ended their armed resistance, the insurgents would "exploit their knowledge of the mujahideen and their methods and their supply routes and they way they maneuvre".

In 2005, the Sunni insurgents and Zarqawi have clashed over both possible peace negotiations and participation in the October referendum on the constitution. Organisations linked with Zarqawi warned as early as last spring against negotiating with the United States, and threatened to kill anyone who worked to turn out voters in the referendum. A coalition of larger insurgent groups called for maximising the vote against the draft constitution.

President Bush in his speech last week was emphatic in ruling out a timetable for withdrawal:

As the Iraqi forces gain experience and the political process advances, we will be able to decrease our troop levels in Iraq without losing our capability to defeat the terrorists. These decisions about troop levels will be driven by the conditions on the ground in Iraq and the good judgment of our commanders - not by artificial timetables set by politicians in Washington. (Applause.)

Some are calling for a deadline for withdrawal. Many advocating an artificial timetable for withdrawing our troops are sincere - but I believe they're sincerely wrong. Pulling our troops out before they've achieved their purpose is not a plan for victory. As Democratic Senator Joe Lieberman said recently, setting an artificial timetable would "discourage our troops because it seems to be heading for the door. It will encourage the terrorists, it will confuse the Iraqi people."

Senator Lieberman is right. Setting an artificial deadline to withdraw would send a message across the world that America is a weak and an unreliable ally. Setting an artificial deadline to withdraw would send a signal to ourenemies - that if they wait long enough, America will cut and run and abandon its friends. And setting an artificial deadline to withdraw would vindicate the terrorists' tactics of beheadings and suicide bombings and mass murder - and invite new attacks on America. To all who wear the uniform, I make you this pledge: America will not run in the face of car bombers and assassins so long as I am your Commander-in-Chief.

Bush didn't explicitly make the argument in this speech that war supporters have used that says if the US were to set up a timetable for withdrawal, the guerrillas would just hold back and wait until the American troops are gone.  The passage I just quoted alludes to this but doesn't make the argument in that way.

But wouldn't this be the best possible outcome at this point?  What I mean is, if there were a negotiated settlement which involved the Iraqi guerrillas breaking with the foreign jihadists and holding off on attacking American troops during a 6-to-12 month period of phased withdrawal, how is that a bad thing?  It seems to me that such a waiting period would offer the best feasible opportunity for a peaceful transition to some kind of national settlement among Sunnis, Shi'a and Kurds that would avoid a civil war.

By virtually all accounts, an all-out civil war looks increasingly likely in Iraq.  But if a negotiated settlement offers a chance of avoiding such a conflict, minimizing the bloodshed and getting rid of foreign jihadists, it seems to me that it would be a big mistake for the United States not to actively pursue such a solution.

But as I've said before, it's by no means certain that the Bush administration intends to withdraw all American troops.  Steve Soto looks at some of the current reasons to think the administration may intend to have permanent US bases in Iraq for a long-term troop presence:  The New "Training" Frame - White House Now Arguing For Indefinite Troop Presence? Left Coaster blog 12/05/05.

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