I've been doing the "Blue's News" headlines at The Blue Voice the past week, and I'll be doing them for the next week or so. It's forced me to do a more systematic search of the news every day than I normally would.
One of the articles that I came across in that process really caught my attention:
‘Old warrior’ B-52 gets call in Afghanistan by Kent Harris Stars and Stripes European edition 09/01/05.
B-52 Stratofortresses — twice as old as some of the crewmembers aboard them — are dropping satellite-guided bombs on targets called for by forces on the ground.
Capt. Andy McElvaine, weapons officer for the 40th Air Expeditionary Group, said “B-52” and “close air support” historically don’t belong in the same sentence. But technological advances have changed that.
“We’ve been providing a lot of close air support pretty effectively,” he said in a telephone interview Tuesday.
And what sort of precision weapons are these newly-precise B-52s dropping? From Harris' report:
Some A-10 Thunderbolt IIs, Army helicopters and Marine Corps aircraft continue to support ground operations in more traditional roles, flying in low while engaging the enemy. But now those fighting against Americans and Afghan government forces on the ground also have to contend with enemies they’ll never see.
That’s because the B-52s perform their missions between 22,000 and 39,000 feet. Sometimes they leave vapor trails. But Capt. Adam, an aircraft commander who declined to give his last name because he said he’s engaged in ongoing operations, said most of the time crews never see their enemies or the effect of the weapons they drop.
He said there was an exception recently on a mission after dark.
The 2,000-pound GBU-31 bomb “lit up the entire night sky” when it struck its target, he said. (my emphasis)
Precision air support. In firefights with small bands of guerrillas. Using 2,000-lb. bombs. Ri-i-ght...
And there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. And the tooth fairy exchanges lost baby teeth for money. And Nixon was not a crook.
It's postmodern war, the Republican Party way; whatever fits the Party line today is Truth.
Now I have to admit that I'm not reporting from any particular knowledge of this particular claim. It may be true. But I'm very skeptical.
As in Vietnam, the US military still seems to be trying to fight the enemy they are most prepared to fight, the Soviet Army Central pouring through the Fulda Gap in Germany, not the guerrillas they are actually fighting. As John Poole writes in Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods (2004):
To more safely occupy a nation, America can no longer ruin its infrastructure. Bosnian society has yet to rebound from the short aerial attack on its transportation network. Even when the pirority is to rebuild that infrastructure (as in Iraq), the ensuing guerrilla effort may preclude it. The most precise of standoff weaponry still produces civilian casualties. It is therefore largely counterproductive in the Muslim world - where vengeance is a duty.
Everyone wants to minimize U.S. casualties, but there are better ways to do so than by allowing U.S. ground forces to eliminate everything in their path. Military historians assert that bombardment has yet to pave the way for infantry through a world-class defense. For centuries, military leaders have tried unsuccessfully to limit the bloodshed [on one's own side] through more violence. Why the Pentagon pays more attention to weaponry than tactics probably has more to do with political economics than with military strategy. Perennially at the top of the list are aircraft, missiles, and large-caliber guns. Many of the key billet holders within both the Army and Marine Corps are supporting-arms officers. Most aviators and artillerymen are "firepower" oriented. They don't realize that covert ground elements can do just as much strategic damage. They assume that firepower-deficient armies have been sacrificing their infantrymen at short range. They have difficulty envisioning a way of war that might require little, if any, control from above. They assume that U.S.ground forces have been tactically evolving as quickly as their Eastern counterparts and will always take fewer casualties with enough preliminary bombardment. Unfortunately, many of their assumptions are wrong. Firepower-deficient Eastern armies have been taking most of their losses at long range. Unlike Western armies, they haven't asked their frontline fighters to rush machineguns for 85 years. Historical exceptions are the result of unforeseen threat or intended feint. All the while, U.S. preparatory fire has mostly hit dummy frontline positions and in the process compromised what little surprise the infantrymen could muster. (my emphasis)
Many in the officer corps are already preparing, even beginning to use, the stab-in-the-back excuse that the military performed brilliantly in Iraq and Afghanistan and made no mistakes to speak of, while the interfering civilians in the Pentagon and the gutless public "lost their will" and undercut the military on the verge of victory.
Such a version of the Vietnam War became far too widely accepted, both in the military and among civilians. That's a big reason the US military is repeating many of the same mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan that were made in Vietnam.
So while the US is trying fighting small bands of Muslim guerrillas by dropping 2,000-lb. bombs on rural areas and winning more sympathy for the guerrillas with every bomb, the stab-in-the-back generals are whining about having to listen to any criticism from those silly voters. We saw some remarkably clear examples of this on Meet the Press of 08/28/05. For instance, Gen. Wayne Downing (ret.) said:
Mr. Russert: All of you have had distinguished military careers, leading men into war. We now have a majority of the American people saying this war is a mistake. General Downing, how long can you conduct a war that is not supported by a majority of the American people?
Gen. Downing: Well, Tim, you absolutely have to have the support of the American people. And the troops that we have in Afghanistan and Iraq right now feel this very, very strongly. They want the support. Quite frankly, I think one of the problems that we're having is that the news media, the opposition to the war are framing this entire discussion in the terms of casualties and casualties only. I think what we don't have is a serious discussion about why you take those casualties.
I'm not sure in what alternative universe the news media are framing discussion of the war "in the terms of casualties and caualties only." Although it's probably not worth spending a lot of time dissecting propaganda claims like this, two questions occur to me when I hear the line.
One is, does it really damage soldiers' morale in the field to hear about citizens at home criticized Dear Leader Bush's policies in Iraq or Afghanistan? This is what Downing's argument implies, and others sometimes make it explicit. I would be surprised if there is anything other than purely anecdotal evidence for that claim. I haven't done any systematic research on it. But every study I recall seeing reference on soldiers' morale indicates that the quality of leadership, unit cohesion and immediate conditions in the field are the relevant factors. Soldiers in actual combat tend to report that they are fighting in the moment to stay alive and for the other members of their unit.
The other is, do they really expect us to believe that none of the soldiers in the field question the superior wisdom of their generals or of Dear Leader? If so, it would be a situation completely unprecedented in the history of American wars. Probably in the history of wars in the entire world.
Gen. Barry McCaffrey (ret.) agreed with Downing, but couldn't quite avoid being dismayed at the reality of what's going on:
I think part--I actually agree with Wayne Downing's views. We haven't put the strategic argument in the right context in the public. However, you know, I pulled out a quote, 24 August news conference, Secretary Rumsfeld: "Throughout history there's always been those that predicted America's failure just around every corner." And he goes on to talk about "many Western intellectuals praised Stalin during the period of World War II."
For God's sakes, Tim, you know, we have to have this argument set up in a respectful manner to the American people. We have had 16,000 killed and wounded, $200 billion. It's a very difficult situation. And I think some of the happy talk and spin coming out of the Pentagon leadership is part of the president's problem.
But McCaffrey later (almost surely inadvertently) gave the game away on the stab-in-the-back claim (my emphasis):
Mr. Russert: Is the volunteer Army at risk?
Gen. McCaffrey: No, not at all. I don't think so. I think--I agree with Wes completely. This is the toughest, strongest, bravest Army we've ever fielded. When I say Army--Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard team along with it. Special Operations capability is absolutely phenomenal. The military won't be the cause of failure. Having said that, we're going to damage fatally the National Guard if we try and continue using Reserve components at this rate. Forty percent of that force in Iraq right now is Reserve component. We have shot the bolt. We've got to back off and build an Army and Marine Corps capable of sustaining these operations.
"The military won't be the cause of failure." No matter what happens, those in and out of uniform who idolize the military already have their postwar script written for Iraq and Afghanistan.
But McCaffrey also let it slip how he, and undoubtedly many others among the officer corps, see the situation in relation to the Iraq War. Despite all the stiff-upper-lip, cheer-for-the-home team optimism, what the outcome is assumed to be is "failure."
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