Sunday, December 21, 2003

Iraq War: The Post-Saddam-Capture Situation (Pt. 3 of 3)

(Cont. from Part 2) The same Business Week issue (12/29/03) carries a column by Stanley Reed on Iraq that encourages a loose federal structure for post-war Iraq. Some of his reporting and analysis is not so convincing to me. But I did a real double-take at this comment, in which he describes the predominantly-Kurdish north as almost independent:

The Kurds have their own de facto border controls, laws, and an 80,000-strong army, and will be loath to permit any rolback of their autonomy.

The last I heard, the Bush Administration was planning a national army for Iraq of only 40,000 troops, compared to around 400,000 prewar in just the regular army, not counting the Republican Guards and other special troops. Given the size of the armies in surrounding countries, that always looked tiny. But if the Kurds have an effective army of 80,000, even if its split between rival political factions, how can that co-exist peacefully with an Iraqi army of only 40,000?

The short answer: a national army of 40,000 for Iraq would assume a permanent American troops presence of significant size there, with the US military deeply involved in Iraqi politics.


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