Has Bush's team really caught all those Al Qaeda leadership types he kept talking about in the debates?
Michael "Spikey Mikey" Isikoff and Mark Hosenball of Newsweek Online add some perspective on Catching Al Qaeda 09/08/04. Noting that Bush's estimate of the number of senior Al Qaeda leaders killed or captured went up just before the Republican convention, they write:
Pressed to explain how and when the estimate went up, a White House official told NEWSWEEK that the revised figure was based on a new CIA analysis that had been repeatedly sought by the White House in recent months and was provided to presidential aides only on Sept. 1, the day before Bush addressed the convention.
But the official insisted the timing had nothing to do with the need to have new numbers for Bush’s convention speech. “This was being watched for some time irrespective of the political calendar,” said the official.
White House and U.S. intelligence officials declined to provide any back-up data for how they developed the new number—or even to explain the methodology that was used, which they said was classified. The absence of any explanation, as well as the timing, prompted some counterterrorism experts to deride the figure as “meaningless” and predict the revision could fuel allegations that the administration is massaging terrorism data for political purposes.
I'm shocked, shocked that anyone would think Bush and his people would massage intelligence data for political purposes! Of course, when it become publicly known that the CIA in July had given him an analysis suggesting that the feasible option for Iraq were basically bad, worse and all-out-civil war, Bush brushed that one off as just a guess.
An official with the recently disbanded 9/11 commission also dismissed the new number, noting that it was impossible to get a firm handle on precisely the number of Al Qaeda “leaders” that were in place at the time of the September 11 attacks—the definition that the CIA says it used as its baseline for the estimate.
“It was meaningless when they said two thirds and it’s meaningless when they saidthree fourths,” said the official, who asked not to be identified. “This sounds like it was pulled out of somebody’s orifice.”
Well, if that's where it came from, it's probably at least as reliable as what Rummy's Office of Special Plans put together with the help of Iranian agent Ahmed Chalabi. The rest of the articles gives an idea of what kinds of estimates these figures are likely to be based on.
This piece also gives some insight into the state of the fight against Al Qaeda: Inside the Mind of Al Qaeda by Peter Grier and Faye Bowers, Christian Science Monitor 10/13/04.
The last three years have certainly challenged Al Qaeda. Afghan training camps have been dismantled, and many top leaders killed or arrested. Cash flow is dwindling and the operational environment is squeezed.
What's worse, to Al Qaeda, may be what the leaders see as a lukewarm reaction on the part of Islam. Jenkins notes that a lengthy January message attributed to bin Laden deliberately portrayed Muslims as "guilty of substandard zealotry," and therefore needing to be aroused to action.
Still, Al Qaeda may see itself as having survived the worst the US could dish out. Successful operations, such as the Madrid train bombings, continue. And most experts believe Al Qaeda is responsible for the bombings in Egyptian Red Sea resorts last week that killed at least 33 and wounded 149. America's invasion of Iraq has provoked Muslims and even split infidel nations - while opening a potential new front for jihad.
The August 2004 report from the Security Council's "1267" Committee on Al Qaeda doesn't present quite such an optimistic picture as Bush did in the debates: First report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities (*.pdf file).
Five years after the Security Council adopted resolution 1267 (1999), the first that dealt with the Taliban and Al-Qaida, the threat from Al-Qaida-related terrorism remains as great as ever. But the nature of the threat has changed. The Taliban have been removed from power and the Al-Qaida leadership is dispersed. But if the leadership is less able to direct, plan and execute attacks, they have many supporters who are eager to do so. These terrorists form groups that do not wait for orders from above but launch attacks when they are ready, against targets of their own choosing. Using minimal resources and exploiting worldwide publicity, they have managed to create an international sense of crisis. ... (my emphasis)
But Security Council sanctions aimed at curbing the Taliban and Al-Qaida terrorism have achieved less than was hoped. This is partly because they address a set of circumstances that no longer apply; and partly because effective sanctions are hard to design, let alone impose, against the form of Al-Qaida associated terrorism that exists today.
This report is useful in seeing how misleading it is to talk about catching the "top leaders" of Al Qaeda, as though it were a Mafia organization or a small band of anarchist conspirators:
Al-Qaida is currently a global network rather than an organization with a structure and hierarchy. In its early days it was well organized and had a formal membership in that individuals, often on behalf of a group they led, offered allegiance to Osama bin Laden; but it is unlikely that this membership ever totalled more than a few hundred. Al-Qaida’s structure provided coordination and support for groups of fighters with certain objectives in common, and supplied troops for the Taliban. Membership of these groups was almost invariably determined by ethnic origin. Very few individuals have been enrolled to conduct terrorist operations under central Al-Qaida control, and although the leadership was at one time directly involved in terrorist operations, and was ready to discuss operational plans with its supporters and to offer them financial support, increasingly it withdrew from direct supervision and merely encouraged whatever activity promoted its objectives. (my emphasis)
The report does not have all bad news. It says that Al Qaeda's ability to plan and carry out attacks was indeed inhibited by the invasion of Afghanistan and the outster of the closely-allied Taliban regime. And the leadership core is still an important, major factor in the world jihadist movement. It's not as though targeted the leadership of Al Qaeda has become somehow unimportant:
The leadership, through its statements, still offers strategic direction even though it leaves tactical decision-making to its supporters. Sophisticated use of the media ensures that Al-Qaida is able to preserve a clear ideological core, and that Osama bin Laden retains his position as an inspirational leader, hovering somewhere between myth and reality.
But the following is also important to recognize (my emphasis):
While individuals such as Osama bin Laden have a symbolic value and strong inspirational image, the survival of Al-Qaida no longer depends on its core leadership. While international action against the senior Taliban proved possible and efective, even without Osama bin Laden and the rest of the best-known Al-Qaida leaders, the threat would remain. The relevance of the Taliban was that they provided Al-Qaida in Afghanistan with the means and space to flourish. But Al-Qaida has been able to take root wherever favourable conditions exist; it will inevitably colonize States where central government tolerates its presence, or where central government is weak. Failed and failing States provide ideally fertile ground for the Al-Qaida inspiration to take hold, and will equally attract outsiders who seek a safe base from which to mount operations.
... There is no prospect of an early end to attacks from Al-Qaida-associated terrorists. They will continue to attack targets in both Muslim and non-Muslim States, choosing them according to the resources they have available and the opportunities that occur. While they will look for ways to attack high profile targets, soft targets will be equally vulnerable.
The report gives a concrete example of how the jihadist movement is evolving, with deadly consequences:
The Al-Qaida inspiration is both practical and religious. Any group that shares its political objectives and religious beliefs, and has the necessary initiative, resourcesand determination, can mount attacks in its name, using similar methodology. It is now popular to refer to "franchise" or "start-up" operations whereby groups with little or no direct contact with the central leadership can become affiliates.
... The group responsible for bombing commuter trains in and approaching Atocha Station in Madrid on 11 March 2004 provides an example of this. A statement by Osama bin Laden in October 2003 had identified Spain as a target for attack and this seems to have inspired those responsible. But the Spanish authorities say they have discovered no clear evidence of any organizational link between the group and the Al-Qaida leadership. As a further indication of how the threat has evolved, these attacks were carried out by people who were relatively well established and integrated within their community, and were not considered by the Spanish authorities to pose an imminent threat. None had been to Afghanistan.
And how has Bush's war of liberation in Iraq affected Al Qaeda's situation?
Currently Iraq also provides a focus for Al-Qaida activity and propaganda. To those ready to believe it, the coalition presence there appears to confirm much of what Osama bin Laden has predicted about the ambitions of the West. Although there is no good evidence to suggest that Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaida leadership have any direct involvement in Iraq, nor any operational control of groups operating there, attacks in Iraq by supporters of Al-Qaida not only contribute to Al-Qaida objectives, but the publicity surrounding them encourages others elsewhere to mount attacks. For example, although Iraq has provided an attractive alternative to fighters who might otherwise have gone to Afghanistan, the Afghan authorities note a correlation between the levels of activity in Iraq and the number of attacks in their own country. (my emphasis)
The report has more details on such issues as the attempts to intervene against Al Qaeda's funding networks. But the funding network is long-standing, dating back to the days when the Muslim jihadists in Afghanistan were noble freedom fighters that the US and Saudi Arabia were proudly helping in their brave struggle against the Soviet occupiers, and it will not be quick or easy to shut down.
If Bush just saying it made it so, Al Qaeda would be practically defeated already. Unfortunately, as in so many things, reality doesn't conform itself to Bush's descriptions quite so easily.
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