This post is mainly a listing of references on the Afghan election of two weeks ago. If they had any usefulness at all for the Afghans, it was to establish some kind of practice at having popular elections. This editorial provides a pretty good summary of the current situation.
Minneapolis Star-Tribune editorial 10/14/04:
So Afghanistan's experiment in democracy got off to a rocky start. That was probably inevitable. But the saddest thing about the election was that it would have gone quite a lot better if the United States had given Afghanistan the attention it really deserved after U.S. forces ousted the Taliban from power. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was absolutely justified and necessary. It was from Afghanistan that Osama bin Laden plotted and carried out, with the Taliban's implicit support, the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. But even in a justified war, the Pottery Barn rule applies: You break it, you own it.
Instead, the Bush administration rushed off to break another country not complicit in terrorism against the United States -- Iraq. As a result, Afghanistan got far too few troops to effectively secure the country, dethrone the warlords, scour out the remaining Taliban and hunt down Osama. It also got far too little aid to adequately reconstruct the country's woeful infrastructure. So the warlords continue in power, the farmers have gone back to growing opium poppies and the Karzai government is confined to Kabul.
AFGANISTAN/AUSTRALIA: Elecciones clave para Bush de Isaac Bigio La Opinión 10/08/04
Boycott threatens Afghanistan's foray into democracy by Scott Baldauf Christian Science Monitor 10/09/04.
An Afghan 'hanging chad' dispute by Scott Baldauf Christian Science Monitor 10/09/04
Sombra de ilegitimidad en elecciones afganas La Opinión 10/10/04
Afghan Voting Peaceful, but Fraud Alleged by Los Angeles Times 10/10/04
General Declares Election a Success Los Angeles Times 10/10/04
Afghan Board to Investigate Election Fraud Complaints by Los Angeles Times 10/10/04
Afghan election considered a success as boycott begins to fall apart b , Knight-Ridder 10/10/04
Los observadores avalan los comicios presidenciales afganos a pesar de las denuncias de fraude El Mundo 10.10.04
Vorwurf der Parteinahme für Karsai (dpa) Süddeutsche Zeitung 11.10.04
Wahlen in Afghanistan als fair gewertet (dpa) Süddeutsche Zeitung 10.10.04
Afghan vote is peaceful but draws loudprotests by Anne Barnard Boston Globe 10/10/04
Protests lose force day after Afghan election by Anne Barnard Boston Globe 10/11/04
Candidate Drops Boycott of Afghan Election by Amy Waldman and Carlotta Gall New York Times 10/11/04
Plan for Investigation Into Afghan Election Eases Dissent by Amy Waldman New York Times 10/11/04
Afghan Election Concerns Subside Washington Post 10/11/04
Top Afghan Challenger Accepts Vote Inquiry by Amy Waldman and Carlotta Gall New York Times 10/12/04
Afghanistan Votes New York Times editorial 10/12/04
15 Afghan Candidates to File Vote Complaints With Panel by Amy Waldman and Carlotta Gall New York Times 10/13/04
Army Says Up to 28 G.I.'s could Face Afghan Abuse Charges by Thom Shanker New York Times 10/13/04
Peaceful vote diminishes Taliban by Scott Baldauf Christian Science Monitor 10/15/04
Afghan Election Post Mortem Oxblog 10/16/04 (via Kevin Drum 10/16/04.) The (anoymous) writer of this post does not credit a lot of strength specifically to the resurgent Taliban, which seems to be very obtimistic in light of other reports from the country. But he also says:
In the first place, the south-eastern insurgency isn’t quite as depleted as its feeble voter intimidation efforts would suggest. Many of the Pashtun leaders who united to prevent a Qanuni or Dostum presidency are still hostile to America and sympathetic to the rebels. In the parliamentary elections, without the clear goal of maintaining a fairly popular co-ethnic president in power, the violent rejectionists will face less intra-Pashtun opposition. If they rally, project their power out of remote provinces like Zabul, Uruzgan, and Khost, and frighten voters away from the polls in populous Helmand and Kandahar, the insurgents could actually threaten the legitimacy of the parliament.
But violent rejection by Pashtun insurgents has never been the main threat to peaceful elections in Afghanistan. The greater, more general threat is from warlords who violently support their client candidates, especially in the ethnically divided north. In the recently concluded presidential campaign, violence of this sort was limited, because it would have been ineffective. It was never likely to affect Karzai’s overwhelming lead, one way or the other; and when Fahim may have been tempted to try it, a prompt and forceful response from Khalilzad and NATO deterred him. In the south, Pashtun tribal differences were set aside in the attempt to get out the vote for Karzai.
The game will be entirely different in the parliamentary elections, with scores of local contests at stake and the overall outcome anything but pre-ordained. In constituencies dominated by a single militia commander, any other candidates risk persecution and assassination. In constituencies divided between rival commanders, the race would be real but potentially bloody. With dozens of close races around the country, a great deal will hang on ballot irregularities and perceived interference at the polls. If the parliamentary elections are monitored as weakly as the presidential election, such disputes are all the more likely to be resolved by force.
Karzai se hace con la victoria en las elecciones presidenciales afganas (EFE, Reuters) El Mundo 24.10.04
Karzai gewinnt Präsidentschaftswahl Der Spiegel 24.10.04
1 comment:
Thanks, Bruce. Excellent article!!
That Happy Chica,
Marcia Ellen
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