Iraq War: The failure to plan for the occupation

The following three-part series about the failure of planning for stability operations in Iraq and on how reconstruction has been blocked by the insurgency was run last week by Knight-Ridder, which has been providing good reporting on the Iraq War and on intelligence matters recently.  (This was before the revelations of the last couple of days about looted explosives in Iraq.)

1. Post-war planning non-existent by Warren P. Strobel and John Walcott 10/17/04
2. Iraq reconstruction efforts overcome by ongoing violence by Jonathan S. Landay and John Walcott 10/16/04
3. Iraq's future path uncertain because of insurgency by Ken Dilanian 10/16/04

(Yes, they consider the 10/17/04 piece Part 1, even though the other two have a day earlier publication date.)

See also Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario by Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, US Army War College Web site; Feb 2003 (*.pdf file).

Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq by Michael E. O'Hanlon and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, Brookings Institute 10/24/04

The New York Times also ran a series on the occupation and the lack of prewar planning for it:

1. The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War by Michael Gordon New York Times 10/19/04
2. Poor Intelligence Misled Troops About Risk of Drawn-Out War by Michael Gordon New York Times 10/20/04.  (See Matt Yglesias' comment at TAPPED 10/20/04.)
3. Debate Lingering on Decision to Dissolve the Iraqi Military by Michael Gordon New York Times 10/21/04.
3a. For Training Iraq's Police, the Main Problem Was Time by Michael Gordon New York Times 10/21/04. (Link may expire after 10/29/04.)

This July 2004 paper, available on the Army War College's Web site, provides a good overview of the problems stemming from the neglect of planning for the transition to post-combat occupation in Iraq.

Effectiveness of Stability Operations During the Initial Implementation of the Transition Phase for Operation Iraqi Freedom by Colonel Paul F. Dicker, US Army Reserve; July 2004. (*.pdf file)

Dicker summarizes the following five sets of recommendations, all of which were "neither embraced nor acted upon by the military."

* In January 2003, about two months prior to the start of the attack on Iraq by the coalition forces, the Marine Warfighting Laboratory conducted wargaming analysis on the effect the Iraqi people will have on the conflict.  This analysis showed that the first thirty to sixty days would be the most critical to influence the Iraqi people and the international community’s perception. This report identified three activities that would be, at least initially, the responsibility of coalition forces, and absolutely critical to achieving success: (1) Maintaining a secure environment for the Iraq people, including law and order; (2) Maintaining basic necessities such as water, electricity, fuel, schools, and hospital services; and (3) Rapid return of infrastructure responsibility, including governance, back to Iraqis. The report also stated that potential for violence against coalition forces would increase with time if Iraqis’ quality of life did notimprove over that realized during Saddam’s regime and there must be a transition of governance back to Iraqis.  Finally, the analysis stressed that humanitarian assistance groups required a safe and secure environment.

* The State Department’s "Future of Iraq" project, created in April 2002 to study the after-war in Iraq scenario, predicted widespread looting and other criminal activity. The report recommended coalition military patrol all major cities throughout Iraq to prevent such action, highlighting the need to protect the vital utilities and government buildings. Electrical, water, and sewage infrastructure would need major investment for repair. The report also recommended retaining half of the Iraqi military and converting them to a peacekeeping force, after being screened by U.S. Military Intelligence, and finding jobs for the remaining deactivated military.   It also raised the point that Iraqi’s media could be exploited to promote the U.S. goals in rebuilding Iraq.

* The Independent Task Force report sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, first issued on 12 March 2003, stated that the U.S. military must sustain public security and humanitarian assistance from the outset of the conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction endeavors must be in a secured environment to be achieved.

* A report from The Center for International and Strategic Studies by Bathsheba Crocker, which was published two months prior to conflict, stressed that a civil policing plan needed to be developed by the administration. The report asserted that until the environment was safe and secured, the U.S. military would have to fill the humanitarian assistance role of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other relief agencies.

* The blue ribbon commission created by the Council on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University argued that the Iraqi Army should not be disbanded and should be used for the internal security of Iraq. Otherwise, there would be a large cohort of armed men, without a job or pay. This report addressed the disrepair of the electrical infrastructure in Iraq, painting a much worse picture than reflected by previous military, estimating a cost of $20 billion to restore to pre-Desert Storm capacity.

Dicker's report is an interesting and readable discussion of the issue.  And, at 20 pages, relatively brief.  One intriguing fact is that he relates that the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), the military body responsible for the planning of the invasion and the aftermath, requested copies of two handbooks on the surrender and military occupation of Germany in the Second World War - which was certainly relevant to post-combat planning for Iraq - on March 17, 2003, just days before the invasion began.

He observes that not only was the prewar planning for the occupation grossly deficient. But even when things clearly started going wrong, the occupation authority was slow to respond. 

Even with the clear indications of serious security problem, no additional preventive action was taken. On the day Kirkuk fell, valuable equipment and spare parts were stolen while US forces waited outside the city.   Several days after entering Baghdad, looting remained out of control. The Ministry of Planning was burned, and furniture was stolen from the Minister of Interior.  Medical supplies and repair equipment were looted from the Rashad Psychiatric Hospital twice.  During ground combat operations, electrical transmission lines were damaged, causing outages. The power plant operators then shutdown the electrical generators and abandoned the substations. Looting and vandalism caused significant damage to the electrical system.  LTG (Ret) Garner stated that the amount of looting and lawlessness was seriously underestimated.  Additionally, U.S. forces watched as the looting was going on, without taking any actions to discourage it.  In discussing the 3 rd Infantry Division in Baghdad, LTG (Ret) Garner indicated that with 260 to 270 sites to guard, there were too few troops left to do security.  He also noted that while driving around Baghdad on the evening of 14 May 2003, he only saw four solders.  According to a staff representative from V Corps HQ, the military force available was not utilized to its potential. Without the transition planfrom CFLCC for implementing Phase 4, supporting plans were not developed. The supporting plans would have included the priorities for security and other necessary actions. Medical facilities, utilities substations, and government buildings should have been placed high on the priority list for protection.

... Rumors were reinforced by U.S. forces only guarding the Ministry of Oil and leaving the schools and hospitals unprotected.

One interesting feature of this paper is that it's a reminder that when it comes to "information activities," the US military can't seem to wean itself of the idea that skillful propaganda can work miracles.

But Dicker's paper is well worth reading, to see a serious military analyst grappling with real, practical problems raised by the occupation.  At the same time, it's revealing to see that someone attempting to do so can hardly confine themselves to happy-talk about how wonderful everything is going in Iraq and how "Freedom is on the march."