Iraq War: How is Iraqification going?

"I think we are winning.  Okay?  I think we're definitely winning.  I think we've been winning for some time." - Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Iraq War 04/26/05

"I just wonder if they will ever tell us the truth." - Harold Casey, Louisville, KY, October 2004.

A new 10/04/06 update of Anthony Cordesman's ongoing study of Iraqi force development is available: Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War: Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job?  (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]).

Here's the short version.  If things go well, the US could be out of there by latest 2015:

Things can only go well, however, if US and other outside powers will have the patience and will to support Iraq as it develops into such a state for at least two to three more years of active fighting. They will provide massive additional economic aid to help Iraq unify and develop. Major assistance and advisory programs will be in place until at least 2010, and probably 2015.  (my emphasis) 

That's his best case scenario.  Here's the worst case, in three possible version.  Version one:

The Iraqi people will lose faith and hope, struggling only to survive. T he military, National Police, regular police and other instruments of government will become an awkward mix of sectarian and ethnic enclaves and struggles for power and control.  The economy will splinter, with a few secure ethnic and sectarian enclaves, but largely dominated by internal tension, insecurity and crime.  The US and other outside powers will stay in Iraq and seek to maintain a partial state of order, but every effort to produce lasting solutions and true national unity will collapse.   (my emphasis) 

Okay, version two of the worst case:

Compromises over key issues like development and modernizing Iraq’s energy industry and infrastructure will be sectarian and ethnic nightmares with Shi’ite, Sunni, and Kurd all seeking their own advantage and that of their respective enclaves.  

The Iraqi people will be forced into clear sectarian and ethnic divisions, each tending to aid the extremist elements in each group. The military, National Police, regular police and other instruments of government will divided into clearly defined sectarian and ethnic enclaves. The economy will splinter ... The US and other outside powers withdraw all or virtually all forces, and reduce aid to token levels. Iraq will become the “sick man” of the Gulf, and the scene of constant outside struggles for influence between Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Sunni states.   (my emphasis) 

Worst case, version three:

The central government will diminish to total impotence and/or collapse under the pressure of civil conflict. The softer forms of sectarian and ethnic cleansing that take place in the previous scenario [worst case #2] will be replaced by vicious fighting for control of given governorates and cities, mass killings, mass forced relocations and migrations, and the ruthless control of remaining minorities. ...

Iraq will have openly split into three parts, dominated by Shi’ite or Kurdish control, or a Shi’ite- Kurdish federation of convenience whose reality will be the same. ...

The Iraqi people will be again forced into clear sectarian and ethnic divisions, each tending to aid the extremist elements in each group. The military, National Police, regular police and other instruments of government will divided along clearly defined and possibly warring sectarian and ethnic lines. The economy will The US and other outside powers withdraw all or virtually all forces, and reduce aid to token levels. Iraq will become the “sick man” of the Gulf, and the scene of constant outside struggles for influence between Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Sunni states.  (my emphasis)

"Wars are easy to get into, but hard as hell to get out of." - George McGovern and Jim McGovern 06/06/05