Civil-military relations

Andrew Bacevich gives us a thought-provoking look at civil-military relations within the Defense Department and what it implies for the future: The Cold War Inside the Pentagon Los Angeles Times 10/03/06.

We could say that there is some value in Rummy and his team being willing to assert more active authority over the generals than was the case during the Clinton Presidency.  But like so much else in the Cheney-Bush administration, that has been dysfunctional, too.  Bacevich writes:

Throughout the Clinton era, the Joint Chiefs continued to exercise a quasi-veto over matters related to national security.

When Rumsfeld took office in 2001, he was intent on shoring up the principle of civilian control. He has done that - although Rumsfeld's idea of control amounts to emasculation. He has bludgeoned generals into submission, marginalized or gotten rid of those inclined to be obstreperous and selected pliable replacements such as Pace.

Assuming - not without reason - that professional military advice frequently comes tainted with extraneous considerations, he has treated that advice with disdain.  Flawed decisions have resulted, adversely affecting everything from war planning to dealing with the Iraq insurgency. Perhaps worse still, Rumsfeld's de facto silencing of the most senior generals has induced a strategic paralysis.  Because the secretary of Defense is not inclined to entertain fundamental questions about Iraq, no one else dares even to pose such questions.  (my emphasis)

Bacevich thinks it will take much more than a change of Defense Secretaries to get the civil-military relationship to the balance it needs to have:

The restoration of an effective civil-military compact - one based on honesty and forthrightness rather than dissimulation - promises to be a daunting task, the equivalent of restoring trust to a marriage after both parties have committed serial infidelities.  No doubt Rumsfeld's removal from office stands as a necessary first step.  But we should not kid ourselves into thinking that his departure alone will suffice.

A state of denial nicely describes the Bush administration's attitude about Iraq.  But "state of denial" also describes our attitude toward a long festering civil-military discord.  As long as that discord persists, the likelihood of more Iraqs will loom large.  (my emphasis)