Monday, March 20, 2006

The jihadist training camps in Pakistan

Mark Kukis, author of My Heart Became Attached: The Strange Odyssey of John Walker Lindh, wrote in Camp Fire: With Friends Like These... The New Republic 02/13/06 (behind subscription) about the likely role of Pakistani training camps in preparing the London subway bombers of last year for terrorist acts:

After September 11, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf vowed to crack down on militant groups in his country, and a number were outlawed. But, since then, some camps have reemerged. To what extent the government remains involved is murky. But experts say the camps operate under the eye of the Pakistani military. "There is no way the camps can run without the military knowing about it," says Vali Nasr, a political scientist specializing in Islamic extremism.  

One of the places would-be jihadis go is Mansehra, a small town about 40 miles north of Islamabad. That is where, in the spring of 2002, I found Hamid. He was one of about ten trainers at a militant camp run by the Harakat ul-Mujahidin, or Movement of Holy Warriors, one of many groups in Pakistan that school guerrilla hopefuls. As we sat talking outside the group's three-story red brick guest house on a quiet hilltop in the center of town, Hamid told me how his group had drawn insurgent volunteers from recruiting offices all over Pakistan. The basic introductory course ran roughly three weeks. Each day started before dawn with prayers and recitations from the Koran by the roughly 100 trainees in each class. After that, the recruits ran and exercised for about two hours. Combat training came after breakfast, with instructors schooling jihadi cadets in small-arms and ambush tactics. 

Most of the volunteers were Pakistanis, though foreigners sometimes signed up, too - including American Taliban fighter John Walker Lindh. Before journeying to Afghanistan, Lindh underwent three weeks of Harakat ul-Mujahidin training in Mansehra in the hopes of doing his jihad in Kashmir. But Hamid said the militant trainers who worked with Lindh decided he wasn't good enough to fight in Kashmir, where guerrillas face the formidable Indian army on difficult terrain. Hamid said the more promising volunteers for Kashmir continue where Lindh left off, doing further intensive training either at one of the camps around Mansehra or at many others like it in the area. But, while Hamid and other members of the Harakat ul-Mujahidin liked Lindh, they felt he couldn't hack their advanced courses; he wasn't in very good shape. So they suggested he consider joining the Taliban in Afghanistan, where he could fulfill his jihad against the then-withering Northern Alliance resistance.  (my emphasis)

This is another instance showing that Lindh was involved with some seriously bad people who were focused on jihad of the military and terrorist kinds.

But the main point Kukis is making is that the continuing activity of the camps raises some difficult questions about just how committed the current Pakistani government is Bushs' global war on terror (GWOT):

Even so, some camps remain open, and militants continue to gather in places like Mansehra. At worst, the Pakistani military is actively involved in the training of men like [London bombers] Tanweer and Khan. At the very least, the military rulers in Islamabad allow militants to carry on terrorist training in territories they control. Last July, a Pakistani news magazine, the Herald, reported that 13 militant camps were active around Mansehra. At the same time, the head of the Indian army, General J.J. Singh, estimated that between 2,000 and 2,500 militants were training in 53 different Pakistani camps. All of which makes Pakistan far from an innocent actor - and raises the question of how much longer we will look the other way while an ally sponsors terrorism.  (my emphasis)

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