Monday, March 27, 2006

Iraq War: Lessons from the loss

"I think we are winning.  Okay?  I think we're definitely winning.  I think we've been winning for some time." - Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Iraq War 04/26/05

"I just wonder if they will ever tell us the truth." - Harold Casey, Louisville, KY, October 2004.

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has a 03/23/06 version of his continually-revised paper about the Iraqi insurgency out.  It's now called Iraq's Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War.

The latest version runs to 327 pages.  But there's an executive summary that's "only" 26 pages.

Cordesman, a supporter of the Iraq War and of (what's left of) Bush's "stay the course" policy, writes in a section of the summary called "The Limits of Cheerleading and Self-Delusion":

There is no way to avoid the fog of war, but there is no reason to make it a self-inflicted wound. Counterinsurgency cannot be fought on the basis of political slogans, official doctrine, ideology, and efforts to spin the situation in the most favorable terms. Unless warfighters and policymakers honestly address the complexity, unique characteristics, and risks and costs of a given conflict, they inevitably come up with solutions that, as the old joke states, are “simple, quick and wrong.” History shows all too clearly that this “simple, quick and wrong” approach is how Americans have created far too many past problems in US foreign policy, and that it is a disastrous recipe for war. In retrospect, fewer US failures occurred because it lacked foresight, than because it could not resist praising itself for progress that did not really exist and choosing simplicity at the expense of reality.

To use another old joke, Iraq is another case where Americans have tended to treat counterinsurgency as if were a third marriage, “a triumph of hope over experience.” The prior history of the insurgency shows that the US began by underestimating the scale of the problems it really had to face and just how many resources, how much time, and how expensive in dollars and blood the cost would be. Counterinsurgency campaigns cannot be based on hope and best cases if the US wants to win. American policy and military planners have to examine all of the
variables, prioritize, and be very careful about the real-world importance of any risks and issues they dismiss. They must be ready for the near certainty of major problems and gross failure in unanticipated areas.

The reality is that counterinsurgency warfare is almost always a “worst case” or nations like the US would not become involved in it in the first place. The US and other Western states become involved in counterinsurgency because an ally has failed, because a friendly nation has failed or because diplomacy and foreign policy have failed. Almost by definition, counterinsurgency means things have already gone seriously wrong.  (my emphasis)

The latter comment may partially reflect the prevailing idea among the officer corps that only conventional war is "real" war.  But even so, it's probably a good way to put it.

In the summary he includes the same three paragraphs as in the main text on the topic of "Honestly Winning the Support of the American People".  He writes:

The sharp gap between the evolution of the insurgency described in the preceding analysis, and the almost endless US efforts to use the media and politics to "spin" a long and uncertain counterinsurgency campaign into turning points and instant victory, has done America, the Bush Administration, and the American military great harm. Spin and shallow propaganda loose [sic] wars rather than win them. They ultimately discredit a war, and the officials and officers who fight it.

Iraq shows that it is critical that an Administration honestly prepares the American people, the Congress and it [sic] allies for the real nature of the war to be fought. To do so, it must prepare them to sustain the expense and sacrifice through truth, not spin. But there is only so much shallow spin that the American people or Congress will take. It isn’t a matter of a cynical media or a people who oppose the war; rubbish is rubbish. If the US “spins” each day with overoptimistic statements and half-truths, it embarks on a process that will sooner or later deprive itself of credibility -- both domestically and internationally.

Iraq is also yet another warning that serious counterinsurgency campaigns often take five to fifteen years. They don’t end conveniently with an assistant secretary or a President’s term in office. Again and again we deny the sheer length of serious counterinsurgencies. Planners, executers, and anyone who explains and justifies such wars needs to be far more honest about the timescales involved, just how long we may have to stay, and that even when an insurgency is largely over, there may be years of aid and advisory efforts.  (my emphasis)

And this guy supports the war!

I love that part, "rubbish is rubbish".  A great way to put it.  And notice that he says that the credibility gap affects not only the war, but "the officials and officers who fight it."  (my emphasis)  Yes, he's criticizing our infallible generals, too.

But with the Bush administration, it's more like "the Party line is truth whether it's rubbish or not".

"Wars are easy to get into, but hard as hell to get out of." - George McGovern and Jim McGovern 06/06/05

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