Thursday, July 20, 2006

Iraq War: An evaluation by a "stay the course" supporter

"I think we are winning.  Okay?  I think we're definitely winning.  I think we've been winning for some time." - Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Iraq War 04/26/05

"I just wonder if they will ever tell us the truth." - Harold Casey, Louisville, KY, October 2004

Via Robert Dreyfuss (Cordesman: Losing in Iraq? 07/20/06), I see that Anthony Cordesman has a new commentary on the Iraq War out.  Dreyfuss describes Cordesman, a leading military analyst who is currrently with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as "a sober-minded conservative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has long been skeptical of the neoconservative project for the Middle East".

I've frequently quoted Cordesman on the Iraq War because, even though he has supported Bush's "stay the course" policy in general, he has also been far more realistic about the difficulties there than most Bush policy supporters.

In Losing the War in Iraq? 07/19/06, Cordesman continues his hard-headed looked at the Iraq War. He writes, "Bad weeks or months do not mean that the Iraqi government and the United States have yet lost that race, but the last few weeks are anything but reassuring."

Among the factors he finds other than reassuring are the rising number of civilian deaths; an apparent increase in injuries as well as kidnapping and other violent crime; ethnic cleansing; bad economic conditions and high unemployment; corruption and theft; the failure of the Baghdad security campaign which began in June (and which for all the US media coverage might as well have taken place on the far side of Mars); the Cheney-Bush administration's claims about Iraq's security forces that have once again proven to be, shall we say, overly optimistic; conflicts among Shi'a groups; and, bad clashes in Kirkuk and Basra.

Although even Cordesman's higher estimates of the total number of war dead are decidedly on the conservative side, he explains how inadequate the official figures are:

The number of civilian deaths is way up. No one knows the real total, either for recent killings or the overall death rate. It seems likely, however, that past estimates of total deaths of 30,000 to 40,000 are now at least 10,000-20,000 too low because they rely far too heavily on Iraqi morgue and Ministry of Health data, and media reports. These figures do not cover outlying areas where reporting is far less accurate or comprehensive, disappearances and kidnappings where the body is never recovered, and hidden body dumps in the desert.

The recent estimates of killing have the same limitations, but the UN is certainly far too conservative in estimating that they were 3,149 in June and 14,338 in the first six months of 2006. The counts are too Baghdad-centric, and seem to cover only deaths actually formally reported. They do not cover all deaths even in outlying areas in Baghdad Province, and reporting on other areas is far less comprehensive. Like far too many attack counts, they exaggerate the degree to which civil violence and the insurrection focus on Baghdad, while other areas are “peaceful.”    (my emphasis)

He's not impressed with the Maliki government's performance so far, especially as evidenced by the failed Baghdad security sweep:

The failure of the Maliki government to be able to show it can act on its good intentions is equally dangerous.  The security campaign in Baghdad never made clear sense.  It came before there was a political compromise and real efforts to control and disarm the militias.  The United States could not put anything like the number of experienced fighters on the ground necessary to control Baghdad, and could not attempt to control the city without alienating many more Iraqis and discrediting the government.  Iraqi military forces are steadily improving their counterinsurgency skills, but are not trained to control civil populations and sweep cities, as distinguished from attack enemies, and control checkpoints.  Their numbers are also simply too low.  Insurgents and militias can simply hide, disperse, ambush, and bomb.  (my emphasis)

His conclusion:

These trends strongly argue that the Iraqi government and United States are now losing, not winning.  They are scarcely based on firm data, however, and they scarcely mean the struggle is lost. What they do mean is that the Maliki government must act far more quickly and decisively, that Iraq's factions have no time to bargain by attrition if they seriously want to avoid civil war or dividing the country, and that the United States must be prepared to rush in aid if this can move political compromises forward.  No one knows the odds of failure or success at this point, but they are notably worse in July than in early June, and they have been slowly deteriorating for months.  (my emphasis)

"Wars are easy to get into, but hard as hell to get out of." - George McGovern and Jim McGovern 06/06/05

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