Iraq War: "Round Two in the Battle of Baghdad"

"I think we are winning.  Okay?  I think we're definitely winning.  I think we've been winning for some time." - Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Iraq War 04/26/05

"I just wonder if they will ever tell us the truth." - Harold Casey, Louisville, KY, October 2004.

Anthony Cordesman has followed up his paper of last week on the security push in Baghdad with an update:  Round Two in the Battle of Baghdad Center for Strategic & International Studies [CSIS]) 08/01/06.  (Didn't we win the Battle of Baghdad in April 2003?  You know, with Saddam's statute being pulled down and all?)

He says that the Round Two operation (Round One was Operation Lighning) begins with certain problems at the start.  Operation Lightning went so badly "that no one is even making a serious pretense that the previous operation [Operation Lightning] scored major gains".  And for the Cheney-Bush administration, that means it must have gone really poorly.

Other problems in Baghdad include:  failure to achieve substantive progress on political compromise between the major sects in the growing civil war; Baghdad's public services still don't function very well; lack of security is making economic activity even more difficult; and, unemployment is going up.  Plus:

The less obvious bad news is that both the U.S. forces and Iraqi government had gradually let the security situation in Baghdad slip for at least six months before this renewed effort began, hoping that elections and reconciliation could do more than an aggressive presence that could alienate various factions. This allowed factional forces to get much stronger, and limited the street smarts and human intelligence available. It created a whole new set of sectarian red zones, many of them Shi’ite. It also gave a major added window of opportunity for crime. (my emphasis)

With all the "good news" about Iraq pouring out from FOX News, who knew that security in Baghdad had been seriously neglected for six months?

Part of the bad news about Round Two is that if it doesn't work in substantially improving security in Baghdad, "Iraq is likely to slip into a major civil war".  And part of the "good news" is:

If the U.S. and Iraqi government win [in Round Two], they face 3-5 more years of political, security, and ecnomic efforts.

Yes, that's the *optmistic* case.  Maybe we'll start withdrawing troops by 2009, if things go super well with Round Two.

And those are the problems he identifies going in.  In the course of Round Two, he sees three major challenges:

The Iraqi government faces several critical problems:

* The first is the lack of major, convincing progress in political reconciliation and any imminent promise of such progress. It is seeking to heal sectarian divisions, but it has so far achieved nothing on a scale that would defuse them.

* The second is that its efforts to clean up the image of the security services and police have failed to the point where it will take months and require dramatic steps to have an impact; little can be done in this round of the Battle of Baghdad. U.S. advisory efforts and partner units can help reduce abuses and perhaps give Iraqi forces more credible victories, but they can’t change the image of Iraqi forces in the time required.

* The third is the lack of government services and a functioning court and criminal justice system. For a few Iraqis, the government is a matter of connections and corruption. For ordinary Iraqis, it simply isn’t there.

Cordesman tries to get numbers.  Here are his numbers for Round Two:

Other obvious bad news is a matter of force ratios. News reports indicate that Baghdad had some 9,000 U.S. troops, 8,500 Iraqi military, and 34,000 Iraqi police to cover the city in Round One. Another 3,500-4,000 U.S. troops and 4,000 Iraqis are said to be deploying.

This sounds like a lot until one remembers that Baghdad is an urban area with 5-6.5 million people and many areas with very high population densities and extremely narrow and complex streets – particularly in places with strong sectarian alignment like Sadr City. Many of the American forces have other duties or are in support roles. A large number of the Iraqi forces really aren’t there.The Iraqi figures include men long gone and units that are almost totally passive or part of the problem. (my emphasis)

Other than all that, there's nothing but sunny skies ahead for Round Two!

"Wars are easy to get into, but hard as hell to get out of." - George McGovern and Jim McGovern 06/06/05