Hopefully one of the results of the Isreal-Lebanon War will be to disabuse some of our military strategists and politicians of the notion that air power is a magic road to victory. And a cheap one.
There has been some short-term recognition of this factor. Here are a few examples:
Air force is not enough by Amos Harel Ha'aretz 08/04/06
The Israel Air Force strikes on Tyre have stopped the fire on Haifa, which has had a rocket-free week, but they have not done Acre any good. IAF commanders admit that Hezbollah still has thousands of Katyushas and hundreds of launchers, and the air force alone cannot deal with it.
This is indeed a change of tone on the part of those who, just a few weeks ago, referred to Lebanon as an updated edition of the successful NATO aerial operation in Kosovo in 1999.
Americans would be well-advised to pay attention to the widespread recognition among Isrealis that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) aren't necessarily the army of wonder-workers that many thought and hoped they were. And not just the air force.
A history of miscalculations by Mark Perry Conflicts Forum/The War in Context 08/03/06
When Ehud Olmert responded to the killing of three Israeli soldiers and the kidnapping of two others by saying that Israel would "destroy" Hezbollah, he meant it. When, five days later, Olmert said that he would hold the Lebanese government responsible for disarming Hezbollah, he meant that too. And when, just fourteen days into the war, he said that Israel would push Hezbollah north of the Litani River he also meant that. Now, on Day 23 of The War for Lebanon, it's clear that Ehud Olmert does not exactly know what he means - an uncertainty that is resulting from an internal Israeli cabinet debate about the war's goals: something that, we would have thought, might have been decided on the night of July 12. ...
This is not the first time that [IDF senior commander Lt. Gen. Dan] Halutz has miscalculated. Shortly before midnight on July 23, 2002, Halutz ordered a bombing mission that destroyed the house of Hamas militant Salah Shehada - as well as every member of his family: 15 people in all, including six children. The attack took place after Hamas announced that any cessation in Israeli activities would be followed by a complete end to Hamas operations. When he was killed, Shehada was actually in the process of initialing a ceasefire order for all members of Hamas's brigades, due to take effect immediately. Shehada's killing ended whatever chances for a ceasefire remained and Hamas continued its campaign targeting Israeli civilians. Asked how he felt knowing that his order resulted in the killing of innocent people, Halutz answered by saying that he was undisturbed: "...if you want to know what I feel when I release a bomb, I will tell you: I feel a light bump to the plane as a result of the bomb's release. A second later it's gone, and that's all. That is what I feel." (my emphasis)
Israel admits air war has failed to end the Hezbollah rocket threat by Dion Nissenbaum and Matthew Schofield, McClatchy Newspapers 08/03/06
The Israeli military began preparing to reoccupy southern Lebanon on Thursday, and Israeli officials conceded that their three-week bombing campaign has had no significant impact on Hezbollah's ability to fire short-range rockets into northern Israel..
"They are still in full capacity to attack our villages," said the official, who briefed a small group of reporters about the military campaign against Hezbollah on the condition of anonymity. "In order to stop the firing, we need a major ground offensive against the short-range rockets." ...
"If you bomb our capital Beirut, we will bomb the capital of your usurping entity. ... We will bomb Tel Aviv," [Hizbullah leader] Nasrallah said in a taped address played on Hezbollah's television news station, Al-Manar. ...
Nasrallah's latest speech suggested that Hezbollah still has the ability to strike deeper into Israel. So far in the campaign, Nasrallah has made good on every threat he's made, from hitting an Israeli naval vessel with a surprise missile attack off the Lebanese coast to striking Haifa, Israel's third-largest city. (my emphasis)
William Arkin has argued, and I think he could be right, that the most significant message in that statement of Nasrallah was not "Tel Aviv" but "our capital Beirut". The head of Hizbullah was referring to Beirut as "our capital", posing as the patriotic defender of Lebanon.
Since Hezbollah sparked the conflict, 68 Israelis have been killed. Nearly two-thirds of those killed have been Israeli soldiers. In response, Israel unleashed a massive air campaign that's killed some 900 Lebanese, most of them civilians. ...
On Thursday, Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz directed the military to prepare for an even more aggressive push that would reach 18 miles into southern Lebanon in a bid to drive Hezbollah north of the Litani River. That would put Israeli soldiers in control of 200 square miles of Lebanon where about 1 million people, many of them Shiite Muslims loyal or sympathetic to Hezbollah, live. ...
But the plan is a direct acknowledgement that the air campaign has failed to end the Hezbollah rocket threat. ...
Faced with its inability to do anything about the short-range rockets, Israeli military leaders say the wider ground operation is essential.
But the [ground] battles with Hezbollah could prove challenging.
"The work is very hard, village to village, house to house," Golan said. "It's very difficult to even see the enemy."
That assessment was echoed by the senior military official backing the ground operation.
"They are well prepared for this kind of invasion," he said, but added: "I think we are much stronger than they are." (my emphasis)
There are those who think that the IDF has been doing fine in the Israel-Lebanon War. Yossi Melman sees it as having been A smart, successful war Ha'aretz 08/04/06. But he makes pretty general arguments. Including this one, which doesn't jive very well with what reports out of Lebanon and the statement of Lebanese political leaders have been saying:
These limitations stem from the Israeli interest and from an explicit American request. They are the reason not only for the American support, but also for the understanding of the majority of the world's countries, including the tacit understanding of most of the Arab states. Similarly, the majority of Lebanese both in Lebanon and abroad want to see Hezbollah defeated and humiliated. (my emphasis)
Even these assumption seems to be a threat:
With all the pain at the losses of the war and the destruction it wrought, this is also a psychological war and a battle for the popular consciousness. And in this battle, Israel is certainly winning. The regular army and the reserves are displaying determination based on a belief in the justness of the cause. Israeli society is shaking off the spider webs of Hassan Nasrallah's metaphor. Hezbollah and Iran gained nothing. Instead of Israel being deterred by the missile threat, it is searing into the consciousness of Tehran, Damascus and perhaps also Hamas, that force of arms and threats will get them nowhere. These entities have to understand that they will get far more concessions from Israel in negotiations. (my emphasis)
For more background on air power issues, see U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2nd Edition J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., June 2006, Chapter 25, "Air Power Theory: An Analytical Narrative From the First World War to the Present by Tami Davis Biddle
Jeffrey Record's Operation Allied Force: Yet Another Wake-Up Call for the Army? Parameters Winter 1999-2000 looks at the Kosovo War, which air power enthusiasts took as validation of the ability of air power to win wars on its own.
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