The way we were ... and the way Presidential war powers are

Sometimes my innner political-science geek just gets the best of me.  So I got all excited when I came across a really, really cool set of Congressional testimonies from constitutional law experts on Presidential war powers.

Back in 2002, after Bush's "axis of evil" speech but before the Iraq war resolution was passed and the Democrats were still in control of the Senate, a Judiciary Subcommittee headed by Russ Feingold held hearings on "Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism".

One of those testifying was Alton Frye of the Council on Foreign Relations.  Among other things, his testimony of 04/17/02 addressed the idea that Bush and his supporters are now promoting almost frantically, the notion that only a failure of the public Will can cause the Bush administration (and our infallible generals) to "lose" in Iraq, however the administration is defining winning and losing this week.

Back on 12/08/05, Rummy was interviewed on the PBS Newshour by Jim Lehrer.  With his usual subtlety and elegance, Rummy stated this stab-in-the-back-alibi in the making as follows:

DONALD RUMSFELD: No, I think what is happening -- and this is the first war that has ever been conducted in the 21st century when you had talk radio, the Internet, e-mails, bloggers, 24-hour news, digital cameras, video cameras, instant access to everything, and we haven't accommodated to that yet.

JIM LEHRER: We meaning?

DONALD RUMSFELD: The world, the society. And we're up against an enemy that understands that they can't win anything in Iraq. They cannot win a battle. The only place they can win is in Washington, D.C. And they know that. And they have media committees. And they are --.

JIM LEHRER: You say this -- excuse me, you say they can't win a battle but they killed 34 people, innocent people on a bus today, they killed 40 Iraqi police two days ago.

DONALD RUMSFELD: It does not take a genius to strap a suicide thing on your body and go in and kill yourself and kill other people.That's not a battle.

JIM LEHRER: But it's a war, isn't it?

DONALD RUMSFELD: It is an aspect of war. But they can't win the war over there. The only place they can win it is in Washington, D.C. And they know that. And they are working it; and they are working it skillfully. And they lie. (my emphasis)

Frye anticipated this discussion back in the spring of 2002:

Steadiness and perseverance are indispensable in warfare, and committing the United States to use force carries an inevitable implication that the effort will be sustained until the mission is successful. Some would argue that too frequent involvement of the Congress will risk weakening or qualifying the resolve necessary to carry out the military tasks. Popular anxieties percolating through the Congress may encourage adversaries to persist in hopes that American will and stamina may falter.

This is one topic on which public discussion got really sloppy in the decades since the Vietnam War.  Qualities like "Resolve" and "Will" are fine if you're doing something necessary and worth doing.  But what happens when conditions change?  Or when things don't turn out as planned?  Or when the costs mount far beyond what had been anticipated?

Frye laid out the other side of this consideration, too. The following is in paragraph form in his testimony.  But I'm breaking it into bullet points here because it's a good look at the balancing considerations.  And even though the possibility of war with Iraq was clearly in everyone's mind at that time, his testimony was almost a year before the invasion of Iraq and thus prior to the particular polemics through which these ideas are discussed right now.

"Against those concerns one must weigh other truths, " he testified:

* Wars often go wrong.

* Costs in lives or resources prove excessive.

* New dangers arise that may justify a change of course and reallocation of military capabilities.

* Presidents, as well as Congress, can make mistakes – and find great difficulty in extracting themselves from commitments gone awry.

* Unless the people and their representatives in Congress give sustained support to military action, such action cannot continue indefinitely.

* Just as the executive branch will have to adapt its military strategy to changing circumstances in the field, Congress needs to retain the ability to adapt and refresh its policy stance in light of those changing circumstances.

The testosterone theory of warfare - we can't back off from a war or the other side will think his God is bigger than our God - has a certain emotional appeal.  So does suicide under certain circumstances.  And driving drunk.  And having sex without STD protection.

But not every war can or should be war for total victory and total destruction of the enemy.  And some judgment about prospects, costs and benefits always enter into consideration, even though they may be swept aware by other factors, like war fever.

Helen of Troy's disappearance (kidnapped or eloped?) may have been worth launching a thousand ships and undertaking years of Bronze Age warfare.  But now that we know that the two official war aims of removing the threat of Iraq's "weapons of mass destruction" (of which there were none) and ending their cooperative relationship with Al Qaeda (which also didn't exist) were actually accomplished before the war began, it's perfectly legitimate for the people and for Congress to ask just what the costs and benefits to the United States are of fighting another three, five, ten years to impose an Islamist government onto Iraq.