Afghan War: Learning from the past

Army Major Stephen D. Pomper takes a look at the USSR's experience in Afghanistan in the Sept/Oct Military Review: Don’t Follow the Bear: The Soviet Attempt to Build Afghanistan’s Military.  Pomper argues that the Soviet Union had a basically sound understanding of counterinsurgency needs in Afghanistan.  But certain deficiencies doomed their effort.

One was the troop level decided upon:

Basically, the Soviets realized that training indigenous forces was vital for victory or, at least, for a successful exit strategy. They knew that securing Afghanistan’s 29 provinces and diverse population would require significant local assistance. Probably because they had based their plan heavily on the use of Afghan soldiers, the Soviets imposed a 115,000-troop ceiling on their 40th Army, which had been tasked with the mission. Not surprisingly, the initial Soviet General Staff planning estimates concluded that it would take 30 to 35 divisions to secure the country - roughly 650,000 soldiers. Still, a Soviet focus on Europe and the global situation at that time relegated the intervention to an economy of force mission.

Troop morale and lack of public support for the mission were significant problems, he writes.  And, yes, even in a dictatorship, the leaders have to take account of public opinion in some way:

Nawroz and Grau summarize the Soviet commitment to Afghanistan: “No army, however sophisticated, well-trained, materially rich, numerically overwhelming, and ruthless, can succeed on the battlefield if it is not psychologically fit and motivated for the fight.” Historian and Soviet expert Robert F. Baumann suggests that Soviet soldiers were told to expect one thing about their role in Afghanistan - that they were liberators—but they quickly discovered this was not the whole truth or even close to it. A Spetsnaz soldier from unit “Recon 66” recalls the varying messages, or “political training,” for the Afghan campaign: “First they told us we were defending our southern borders, there was some other nonsense.” As the troops became frustrated and then angry, they focused their aggression counterproductively on the Afghan people. In short, the Soviet military was not ready for the fight they foundin Afghanistan.

Things didn't go entirely smoothly in training armed forces for the government of the country they had liberated:

The Soviet solution and result were predictable: Separate companies were combined into regiments that were then stacked into larger and larger organizations. The Soviets thus imposed a standard, large-scale table of organization and equipment structure on what remained of the Afghan forces. Yet, these forces were not preparing for a Fulda Gap-type high-intensity battle; they were fighting an irregular insurgency.

Afghan forces were primarily armed with Soviet equipment, but it was not as sophisticated as their Slavic brothers’ arms. Poor training on the equipment led to incorrect use and premature breakdown. Deplorable maintenance rates were the inevitable result, and the lack of trained mechanics, signal operators, and other technicians prevented a long-term solution. Inadequate resupply by Soviet advisers (and the DRA system), looting by rebel forces, defections, and a tendency to trade equipment for drugs made the situation even worse. Late in the war, the mujahideen, or dukhi (ghost spirits) as the Russians called them, were often better equipped than their superpower-backed rivals.

He notes that infiltration of the DRA (Afghan government) army by the mujahideen - we Americans knew them as heroic Islamic "freedom fighters" then; we call the Muslim terrorists or jihadists now.

His diagnosis of the causes of Soviet failure are as follows:

No single cause led to the Soviets’ failure in Afghanistan; rather, a combination of factors created the "USSR’s Vietnam."  Weak political support, of which both the USSR and the DRA were guilty, crippled training and the occupation. This absence of political support and resolve led to a corresponding lack of will that sapped Soviet and Afghan troops, as well as their leaders. Add to this poor doctrine, equipment, and organization, and the Soviet mission bordered on the impossible. Finally, the Russians’ "my way or the highway" insistence on conventionalizing DRA forces added icing to the funeral cake.

Of course, the longevity of this war also worked against Soviet success. The longer the conflict lasted, the more technology and firepower the Soviets poured in, a strategy that yielded fewer trained soldiers, increased the number of civilian deaths, and bred hatred of the war and those who had started it. Over time, too, the resistance solidified, became more capable, and gained allies - namely the United States.

He might have added Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, among others.