The US and Saudi Arabia

Bradley Bowman in the Winter 2005-6 edition of the US Army War College journal Parameters looks at the considerations underlying US foreign policy toward Saudi Arabia and recommends steering a course between the pragmatic-realist and democracy-promotion options: Realism and Idealism: US Policy toward Saudi Arabia, from the Cold War to Today.

During the Cold War, he writes, the US interests in Saudi Arabia were perceived as being "essentially anti-communism and oil".  And he describes how the ultraconservative Saudi monarchy skillfully played on US fears of Communism and the USSR to persuade the US to see things their way in foreign policy.

Bowman contends that the Saudi fear of communism was greatly exaggerated:

In hindsight, the US fear of increased Soviet influence in Saudi Arabia was largely unjustified. The primary reason for this relates to the character of the Saudi regime. Ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, and his successors feared and hated communism. The Saudis feared communism because of its stated expansionist goals and its success through the years in neighboring countries such as South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. The Saudis also hated communism because of its promotion of atheism and persecution of Muslims. A statement by Amir Faisal to a British Ambassador in 1948 demonstrates the intensity of the Saudi fear and hatred of communism. Faisal expressed his concern that “time is on the side of the communists and . . . if they are given ten years of peace they will become so strong as to be undefeatable.” Sounding more like George Patton or Douglas MacArthur, Faisal reportedly suggested that the “anti-communist powers” should undertake a preventive war against the Soviet Union before it was too late.

The allusion to George Patton and preventive war against the USSR is something that has become a staple of conservative folklore.  Actually, Patton's famous recommendation on that topic was one more instance of his exceptionally bad habit of shooting off his mouth carelessly, in this case to a German general who was a hunting buddy of his.  Senior American military officials regarded it as one more instance of Patton's bad judgment, not as a policy suggestion to be taken seriously.

Saudi Arabia actively promoted opposition to Communism is the region: "It is estimated that by 1978, Saudi Arabia spent an average of $5 billion annually on foreign aid, much of it to oppose communism."  What Bowman doesn't make clear is that Saudi foreign policy didn't promote just any brand of anti-Communism, but conservative, Islamist politics in particular.

He does note that the Saudis' fear and hatred of Communism was deeply bound up with their conservative Islamic convictions.  He quotes King Saud from 1955:

Our very special attitude towards communism is well-known to [the] US government and to [the] world. It is our interest that communism not infiltrate into any area of the Middle East. In opposing communism, we do so on basic religious belief and Islamic principle, in which we believe with all of our heart, and not to please America or western states. My position, in particular, of Moslem Arab King, servant to Holy Shrines, looked up to by 400 million Moslems in East and West, is extremely delicate and serious before God, my nation, and history.

Bowman argues for an American policy that does not exaggerate the risks to Saudi Arabia from jihadist groups, but also doesn't invite unnecessary instability by pushing too hard for democratic reforms:

The United States needs to ensure that Saudi Islamic extremists who are sympathetic to Osama bin Laden do not gain control of the world’s most important oil supply. However, the United States also should end five decades of policy that sacrificed idealist values to exaggerated threat assessments. ...

The preeminent US realist interest in the Middle East is oil, and if the United States pursues political and civil reform recklessly or too aggressively, US access to Saudi oil could be endangered.

He also has some useful (if general) observations about the development of democracy in Saudi Arabia that could apply to other countries as well:

Expectations for democratization should be measured in terms of decades rather than years. ...

If the United States insists that an authoritarian government transform itself into a democracy in a few short years, it should be little surprise that this process has a destabilizing effect. ...

Elections represent an essential component of the modern notion of liberal democracy, but elections are not the only component. Constrained executive power, rule of law, an independent and nondiscriminatory judiciary, civil liberties such as the freedom of the press and the freedom to join groups and lobby government, and the right to own private property are also important components of a healthy liberal democracy. Elections in a country that has not had the time to develop these important components often result in an unstable and tenuous “democracy” that frequently falls back into authoritarianism.