"I think we are winning. Okay? I think we're definitely winning. I think we've been winning for some time." - Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Iraq War 04/26/05
"I just wonder if they will ever tell us the truth." - Harold Casey, Louisville, KY, October 2004.
Following up on my last post about Iraqi force development and the new report by Andrew Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), there is a related report that Cordesman introduces in this press release: Understanding the Details of Iraqi Force Development 11/22/05. The other study is specifically "to make the reader familiar with official US reporting on Iraqi force development, and not as an analysis of the validity of such Coalition reporting": Iraqi Force Development: Coalition Reporting as of the Fall of 2005 (Working Draft: Updated as of November 21, 2005) by Anthony Cordesman with William D. Sullivan, CSIS.
The report I cited in my last post is designed more as Cordesman's own analysis of the Iraqi forces, not just as an explanation of the official government sources.
In the 11/22 press release, Cordesman summarizes the key developments as reflected in the 11/21 report (the explanation of the government sources) as follows:
* A continued increase in the number of Iraqi units able to take the lead in combat operations against the insurgency. There are now 88 Iraqi Army and special operations battalions conducting combat operations against the enemy-an increase of nine since the July report. Of the 88 operational units, 36 are assessed as being “in the lead” or fully independent - a 50% increase over units at these levels of readiness in the July [CSIS] report. There are 28 Special Police Force battalions capable of combat operations - an increase of 13 since the last report.
* Progress of Iraqi units in assuming responsibility for the battle space. Since the last report, Iraqi forces have taken responsibility for security in several areas of Iraq and now have the lead in one Iraqi province, roughly 87 square miles of Baghdad and over 450 square miles in other provinces.
* A continued increase in the number of units and individuals trained, equipped, and formed into operational status. More than 87,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen have now been trained and equipped - an increase of 10,000 since the last report. A total of 68,800 police have been trained and equipped - an increase of 5,500 since the last reporting period. These work alongside 35,500 other Ministry of Interior forces. Overall, this represents a 12% increase in Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces trained and equipped for counterinsurgency operations since July 2005.
The troops levels need to be measured against Iraq's prewar military. Many of the figures reported reported by the administration and therefore in the press combined army and police figures into "Iraqi security forces". Iraq's prewar army alone contained about 400,000 soldiers, not including police forces. And that was just the regular army. Saddam had additional special military units, like the "elite" Republican Guard and the irregular Fedayeen Saddam that caused considerable distraction for the Anglo-American forces during the conventional war in the south.
Even assuming (very optimistically and against all preveious experience) that the official number of 87,000 soldiers and sailors trained and equipped is correct, that's a long way from 400,000. And even by the official figures, not all of those are prepared to operate fully independently. If a drawdown of American troops is dependent on the Iraqi forces "standing up", even the official figures don't seem to promise an early exit for American troops.
According to Cordesman's 11/21 report, the current plans don't call for a force even close to the prewar levels. Not that the figures in the following are combined Iraqi security forces (ISF; military analyses use a bijillion acronyms):
The Iraqi government continually assesses its force requirements based on current threat. Iraqi forces have already grown from 96,000 in September 2004 to over 210,000 in November 2005. They will reach a total of 270,000 by July 2006. The Iraqi government currently projects an end-state combined total force structure for the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior of 325,000 – an increase of about 28,000 since the previous report, mainly because of an increase in authorized army and combat service support personnel at MOD. It plans to reach this level, and complete its total force generation effort, by August 2007. (my emphasis)
Later in the report, he writes that the projected final number of Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces, i.e., most ISF other than soldiers, is 195,000. That means the current plans call for something like an Iraqi army, navy and air force of 130,000 in August 2007. And that level is planned as a final level. For comparison, there are currently around 160,000 American troops in Iraq.
So, even in the best case, we have to seriously ask, can Iraq function as an independent and unified state with a level of ISF that much lower than before the war?
Anthony Shadid in Night Draws Near (2005) reminds us of the "cakewalk" prewar expectations of the neoconservative fantasists:
To many in the U.S. government, the dictator's [Saddam's] collapse had stood as the aim of Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to the ideology that drove that crusade, everything would fall into place after Saddam's departure. U.S. leaders dangerously misplaced their faith, believing in their own rhetoric of liberation. Exiles like Ahmad Chalabi, whose Iraqi National Congress wielded enormous influence in the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon, told Bush's men what they wanted to hear: sweets and flowers awaited the American troops. With Saddam gone, jubilant Iraqis would embrace those who had freed them. Together with the exiles, the Americans would create an outpost of democracy and prosperity in a region with little of either. This vision colored every decision. ...
In fact, within days of Saddam's fall in April, as the city reeled in mayhem, top U.S. commanders were already considering plans to bring the 140,000 troops down to almost one-fifth that number [i.e., 28,000] by September. Fearful of military commitments that could drag on for years, Bush's advisers hoped to avoid saddling the armed forces with the task of rebuilding a state. But no one seemed to recognize that the troops already in Baghdad were, eventhen, looking ill-equipped to deal with the surging tumult. Their armored columns were designed to fight Saddam's mechanized army, not legions of gaunt, exuberant looters coursing through an edgy and unsettled city. (my emphasis)
Cordesman explains that the US and the Iraqi government evaluate the readiness of troops according to a set of guidelines called the Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA). In the TRA, an independent unit is defined as follows, he writes:
The final level is the one at which the unit is fully independent – not just capable of leading operations but requiring no Coalition assistance in any form. Considering the need for further development of Iraqi logistical elements, ministry capacity and capability, intelligence structures and command and control, it will take some time before a substantial number of units are assessed as fully independent and requiring no assistance. (my emphasis)
Compare that to this claim (my emphasis):
Some critics dismiss this progress and point to the fact that only one Iraqi battalion has achieved complete independence from the coalition. To achieve complete independence, an Iraqi battalion must do more than fight the enemy on its own - it must also have the ability to provide its own support elements, including logistics, airlift, intelligence, and command and control through their ministries. Not every Iraqi unit has to meet this level of capability in order for the Iraqi security forces to take the lead in the fight against the enemy. As a matter of fact, there are some battalions from NATO militaries that would not be able to meet this standard. The facts are that Iraqi units are growing more independent and more capable; they are defending their new democracy with courage and determination. They're in the fight today, and they will be in the fight for freedom tomorrow. (President Outlines Strategy for Victory in Iraq at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland; White House Web site 11/30/05)
Cordesman makes the same argument (in the report written "to make the reader familiar with official US reporting on Iraqi force development, and not as an analysis of the validity of such Coalition reporting"):
Much has been made about the observation that only one Iraqi MOD battalion is at level one – fully independent, not just capable of leading operations. Coalition Forces are helping Iraqis not just build combat elements but establish all the supporting infrastructure needed to sustain them – materiel, logistics, doctrine, command and control, and other functions.
Development of Iraqi units takes place in the midst of an insurgency, with the enemy actively attempting to disrupt the re-establishment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), destroy their infrastructure and equipment, and intimidate recruits. In this context, the progress of the ISF is truly remarkable; even some U.S. allies would not be able to meet level one standards because they do not have the enablers they need to operate fully independently.
Progress also needs to be seen through a wider aperture. The more accurate measure of progress is Iraqi units in the lead – planning and successfully executing counterinsurgency operations, with minimal direct support or assistance of Coalition Forces. It is at level two that Iraqi units can take their own battle space, and it is at that level – where there has been steady progress – that the Coalition is focusing current efforts.
This progress in Iraqi Security Forces development is apparent on the ground. Iraqi battalions of the 3d Iraqi Division, the Border Force, and the Police Commando Division were operating in northwestern Iraq during recent combat operations in and around Tal Afar. Iraqi battalions from several different divisions – police and army – are also fighting in Anbar province with Coalition
Additionally, an Iraqi Police Mechanized Battalion is assisting coalition forces in securing the airport road, and three Iraqi battalions now secure a major thoroughfare in Baghdad (Haifa Street). Iraqi security forces have responsibility for the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala and other locations.
But progress is relative: "The inability of suicide bombers to penetrate police and military facilities regularly is an encouraging indicator." (my emphasis)
In fact, it is by no means certain - in fact, it's very unlikely - that the administration's plans call for an Iraqi military able to operate independently of the US.
So far, they don't seem to include plans for much of an Iraqi air force. Cordesman:
The Iraqi Air Force has more than 200 trained and equipped personnel. A squadron of three C- 130E aircraft operates regularly from Ali Air Base. The squadron supported the recent counterinsurgency operation in Tal Afar by transporting Iraqi Army soldiers and commandos to Tal Afar in late August and early September.
The Ministry of Defense (MOD) still has not concluded a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program to sustain the C-130E fleet, resulting in MNSTC-I continuing to fund operations and maintenance costs. Resolution of the FMS case remains an issue that MNSTC-I regularly addresses with the MOD.
The Iraqi Air Force also operates a fleet of small reconnaissance aircraft: two Seekers, six CompAir aircraft, and six CH-2000s. The Seeker and the CompAir aircraft are flying reconnaissance missions daily. The six CH-2000 aircraft are currently grounded for engineering deficiencies. A lack of Ministry of Defense funding limits fuel and spares for the reconnaissance aircraft. The Iraqi Air Force also operates five Bell Jet Ranger
helicopters.
These aircraft are used for training purposes only. The helicopter fleet also includes four donated UH-1 helicopters in Iraq. Another twelve are being held by Jordan awaiting final decision by the Iraqi Air Force on conversion to Huey Two, a version more capable of operating in the Iraqi environment. None of the UH-1 aircraft in the Iraqi Air Force are currently operating, because of maintenance problems.
Training for the Iraqi Air Force consists of pilot sustainment and conversion training. Maintenance training is also being accomplished. All training is provided by the Coalition Air Advisory Support Team. Iraqi pilots generally have many hours of flight time, but tend to be senior officers. A system of recruiting and developingjunior pilots needs to be developed.
This is also an interesting observation from Cordesman's report:
Absent without leave (AWOL) rates are a significant problem in areas where there is considerable strife, such as Fallujah, Ramadi, and Samarra. This situation is largely attributed to intimidation by the insurgents. Absenteeism in the Iraqi Police Service is difficult to quantify because the patrol, station and traffic police are operating without significant transition team oversight. IPS absentee data will be more precisely known when International Police Liaison Officers are more readily able to work at local police stations on a regular basis. (my emphasis)
"Wars are easy to get into, but hard as hell to get out of." - George McGovern and Jim McGovern 06/06/05
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