It seems to me that it's impossible to understand the real dilemma that the United States faces in Iraq right now without keeping in mind three problems.
1. Too few troops from the start. Military estimates referring to the ratio of NATO forces to population in Kosovo have suggested that a force of up to 600,000 soldiers would be needed to achieve equally effective coverage in Iraq. Even with the latest escalation of troop numbers, the "coalition's" occupation army in Iraq has around 150,000.
2. Disbanding the Iraqi army. This is almost universally recognized as a disastrous mistake, although the Bush Administration that never admits any mistake is unlikely to admit this one either. But Viceroy Jerry Bremer dismissed the entire pre-invasion regular army of 400,000 trained, well-armed men, making them immediately angry, unemployed and available for recruitment as guerrillas.
3. Planning for a tiny Iraqi army. Postwar Bush Administration plans called for an army of 40,000 for the new Iraq. That's fewer troops under arms than Saudi Arabia has. Surrounded by Turkey, Iran, Syria and Jordan, no sovereign Iraqi government could settle for an army that small. Planning for a force that size meant assuming a significant American troop presence indefinitely. It also meant that they had no conception that to counter even a much lower-level insurrection than we now have in Iraq, an effective Iraqi army would be required.
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