Steve Gilliard argues that the proposed use of assassination squads is an act of desperation by an American Army that doesn't have adequate counterinsurgency troops or the allies who might be able to provide them. Scroll down to Part III: The wrong tactics, misapplied strategy 12/10/03 (my emphasis):
<< One solution to our present troubles in Iraq is to unleash hell in the form of Task Force 121, where US Special Ops teams and Iraqi colaborators will run around and kill guerrilla leaders. Well, if you can't do what works, you might as well do what you know. Only problem is that we don't have an ARVN [South Vietnamese Army], or even Salvadoran Army to help us here, just some secret policemen who's intelligence skills were questionable at best. The fact that Pentagon insiders so hate this plan that they leaked its Israeli connection should be evident of the likelihood of success. After all, they know just the mention of the word Israeli is enough to send the average Arab into a tissy.
<< The problem with these hunter-killer teams is that they are used for personal vendettas as much as anything. ... US troops have this mysterious expectation that people [in Iraq] will turn over their cousins to the Americans after freely admitting they can't protect informants. Yet, they expect these guys to turn over family. Not gonna happen.
<< The whole hunter-killer mentality is one which needs to be examined. From every report, the Iraqi resistance is decentralized. So even if you kill Commander Abu, Commander Raheem may still blow things up. There is no central nexus to eliminate. So why the emphasis on these highly trained teams running about, risking discovery and destruction for minimal gain? Because there is nothing but failure to report. There is a need to do something. So they go back to the old playbook, which is special ops. >>
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