(Cont. from Part 1) The After Action Report gives some indication of what a challenge the transition to occupation and counterinsurgency has been (my emphasis):
<< The Law of Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention require U.S. forces to protect specific targets such as hospitals, schools, population centers, and religious sites. [Notice that this Army report shows rather more concern for international law than the Secretary of Defense does.] Accurate IPB [intelligence prepartion of the battlefield] is important to identify these sites and adequately protect them.
<< Information about the infrastructure of the AO [area of operations] is critical for planning and prioritizing SASO [Support and Stability Operations]. Restoring any lost services after the cessation of hostilities is critical to establishing and legitimizing coalition control. Knowing the electrical, gas, water, and sewage distribution systems and how they are interconnected is essential to getting them functioning. Often, the facilities are intact, but not operating; knowing what facilities to restart is over half the battle.
<< The IPB must also identify the key locations for restoring a functioning society that will need protection such as banks, government buildings, public records, fire stations, police stations, court houses, jails/prisons and any other location that will have a significant impact on restoring the functions of a city/society. This identification enables commanders to determine risk and to allocate resources. >>
The report observes, "The transition from warfighting to SASO is a huge shift in priorities and focus for the entire division from the soldier in the street up to the division commander. The IPB for this transition needs to begin much earlier than the change itself." A major point of David Rieff's analysis mentioned in an earlier post is that lack of planning for "SASO" as the Army calls it compounded problems that were going to be serious in the best of circumstances.
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