The Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report (.pdf file) I mentioned in a previous post has some good observations about how the lack of preparation for the stabilization/occupation/counterinsurgency phase of the Iraq War affected how badly the occupation started, if you can translate the military jargon (my emphasis):
<< In preparation for SASO [Support and Stability Operations], units should continue to train civil-military operations (CMO) as part of their full spectrum operations training. The use of CMO situational training exercises (STX) training lanes incorporating detailed scenarios supports this home station training effort. The division as a whole did not focus on CMO training prior to the beginning of combat operations, instead focusing on mid intensity [conventional war] operations. Given that there are situations that mandate decentralized execution by our soldiers, a requirement exists to train the soldiers on a variety of scenarios.
<< As the division transitioned to SASO, it did not have sufficient forces or effective rules of engagement (ROE) to control civilian looting and rioting throughout the city [Baghdad]. Looting by the local civilians was a significant obstacle to the reestablishment of order in such a heavily populated area. Units were not able to dedicate resources to stop initial looting due to ongoing combat operations. However, once the enemy situation permitted, companies were able to focus on looting and began to detain and process looting civilians as EPWs [enemy prisoners of war]. The problem quickly diminished to a condition that a local organized "neighborhood watch" [i.e., private armed militias] could control.
<< Looting and rioting are one of the many competing priorities that commanders must plan for early in the transition to SASO. Employment of non-lethal munitions should be planned and resourced to allow a graduated response and minimize civilian casualties. >> (Cont. in Part 2)
No comments:
Post a Comment