(Cont. from Part 2) Krepinevich argues that because "regime-change" is becoming a normal kind of operation for the US (even apart from the particulars of the Bush Doctrine of preventive war), "the US military's preference to do what it does best - defeat enemy forces in the field and then quickly depart - must be overcome." He says that the approach "of crafting quick exit strategies" - which was central to the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine - "must yield to a willingness to develop a comprehensive strategy for winning both the war and the postconflict period that follows."
Providing stability in postwar environments and building new national institutions are more uncertain undertakings than conventional war, in which the US military can better determine the outcomes. And "success is hardly assured." Krepinevich observes:
As can be seen in the wake of the coalition's victory in Iraq, those who practice regime change incur consequences as well as certain moral and political responsibilities. While this has always been true, the stakes are particularly high in Iraq. Recent experience shows that when the United States pursues a quick exit strategy following a regime-change intervention, as in Haiti, there is a high risk that the situation will revert to its pre-intervention state.
He warns that putting in place a "legitimate, representative, pro-American" regime in Iraq will be a long, difficult effort:
While operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan impose a significant tax on the US military's forces and budgets, they are small potatoes compared to Iraq, even if other like-minded states, such as those that participated in the Second Gulf War coalition, provide support.
Ideology and politics aren't unknown even in academic papers targeted to military planners. But reading pieces like this is a welcome break from the non-stop spin of the daily commentaries on the war.
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