(Cont from Part 1) There's a double meaning in this observation. On the one hand, Krepinevich is pointing to some systematic problems that the Iraqi army in particular experienced. But his analysis also suggests that lessons about the effectiveness of the US approach have to be drawn with those problems of the enemy army in mind.
His analysis also stresses the importance of international support. As Iraq showed, the US has an unrivaled ability to project its military power around the world. But, he says:
What America does desire, and need, is some measure of political sanction from members of the international community. Such support lends legitimacy to US actions. As the principal guarantor of the international order and a prime beneficiary of that order, the United States has a strong interest in promoting established international rules and norms. Such international sanction has also proven important in establishing and maintaining domestic political support for major military operations abroad.
In addition, the experiences of recent years, including Afghanistan and Iraq, have showed that the US also needs allies to assist in "stability operations and nation-building efforts." Which gets to the core of one of Krepinevich's major concerns. He calls on civilian and military policy-makers and planners to recognize that we are "in the regime-change business." (Cont. in Part 3)
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