Escalating in Iraq

And we send a few more...

U.S. force in Iraq to grow as Marine deployment pushed up USA Today 06/08/04

The Pentagon will increase the number of U.S. troops in Iraq to around 145,000 this summer, from the current 140,000, in recognition of the continued difficulty coalition forces are having in providing security leading up to the hand-over of political power to Iraqis on June 30.

Overall, U.S. force levels in Iraq could rise even higher than 145,000 as Marines already in Iraq have their tours extended to overlap with incoming replacements, said Lt. Gen. Robert Magnus, deputy commandant for programs and resources. How long the Marines now due to rotate home will be forced to stay "depends on how well the Iraqi forces come along and whether there are more troops, or less troops, from foreign countries," Magnus told reporters Tuesday. ...

Pentagon planners had originally hoped to shrink the number of U.S. troops in Iraq to 105,000 by this summer, but commanders asked for more troops to battle the tenacious insurgency there. Army Capt. Bruce Frame, a spokesman for U.S. Central Command, which oversees military operations in the region that includes Iraq, said there are 140,000 troops in Iraq now before the accelerated arrival of the 5,000 Marines. No Army units are scheduled to leave the region before August. The first Army units that are scheduled to leave are elements of the 1st Armored Division and the 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment; they were originally scheduled to go in late April but had their one-year tours extended for 90 days.

The short-term military needs require some kind of stop-gap measures like this.  But even this level of commitment is putting a significant strain on the armed forces.  And the massive use of reserves for long callups and the extension of tours are a backdoor form of conscription.

But we're now caught in the escalation trap in Iraq.  The current troop levels are inadequate for an effective nationwide counterinsurgency war.  But do small escalations make any sense unless we intend to make the major escalation that would be acquired to stabilize the country?  Or does doing so just postpone the hard decisions about how to exit the war without "finishing the job," as Old Man Bush's critics so often said after the 1991 Gulf War?

Nick Confessore just won a Livingston Award for this article from over a year ago about the pressures on military manpower:  G.I. Woe Washinton Monthly March 2003.