A bad idea that hasn't died off yet

Business Week magazine and its commentator Bruce Nussbaum, who has been doing some good analysis of the Iraq War and its implications, have a particular fondness for the Powell Doctrine, which was first known as the Weinberger Doctrine, after Casper Weinberger, Defense Secretary in the Reagan Administration.

(One or both of the BW articles I'm referencing here may be behind subscription; click the links and give them a try.)

In a long commentary, Nussbaum sings the praises of the Powell Doctrine: It's Time to Shelve the Rumsfeld Doctrine 04/26/04.

The best hope left of establishing a stable Iraqi democracy is to replace that doctrine, which emphasizes small, light, and fast military operations, with its rival, the Powell Doctrine, devised by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. The Powell Doctrine calls for overwhelming force shaped by very clear political goals and a specific exit strategy, two things lacking today in Iraq.

Actually, a key part of the Powell Doctrine was to have a clear exit strategy before the war.  So it's too late for that, now.  Though, obviously, we'll eventually have to have one.

Here's why: The Rumsfeld Doctrine promised that a high-tech military could easily win battles anywhere around the world with relatively small numbers of soldiers on the ground. It argued that the power and accuracy of the latest weapons more than compensated for fewer troops, releasing the U.S. from the constraints of needing allies to help supply large numbers of soldiers. It allowed the U.S. to bypass the U.N. and NATO in projecting power overseas. In effect, the Rumsfeld Doctrine provided the military rationale for the Administration's foreign policy of unilateral preemption that was anti-European (Old Europe -- France and Germany) and anti-U.N. Prior to the Persian Gulf War, George H.W. Bush spent months negotiating with dozens of countries to assemble a huge coalition of European and Middle Eastern armies to overwhelm Saddam. Bush I played by the rules of the Powell Doctrine. Bush II took the U.S. in basically alone, with real help only from the British.

Not everything about the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine was bad.  It certainly made for more caution than was displayed in planning the Iraq War.  It's just that the Powell Doctrine mandates ideal conditions which cannot always be expected to be present in military operations that may be necessary.

Nussbaum does have a point, though, about the value of even a day-late-and-a-dollar-short version of the Powell Doctrine in the Iraq War:

A return to the Powell Doctrine would accomplish a number of key goals. Significantly higher troop levels would crush, finally, Baathist resistance and provide more security to Iraqis. The U.S. may have to bring back the divisions it sent home. Accepting a key U.N. role in shaping the political process would bring in moderate Iraqi clerics and promote the best chance of creating a stable government. It is the only way to get support from European and Asian allies.

The realpolitik of the Powell Doctrine would also force Washington to limit its goals and make its exit strategy clear. Is the goal of the U.S. to set up a stable Iraqi government that balances Kurd, Sunni, and Shiite interests? That might take three or four years of military and financial help. But if the goal is to build a genuine Iraqi democracy that protects women's rights, that could take decades. What is truly feasible?

But events have already moved beyond some of that.  The Bush team used the UN to put a thin multinational gloss on the perpetuation in power of the US hand-picked Interim Governing Council, now to be designated in a mildly modified form as the "sovereign" government of Iraq.

No other countries are going to send significant numbers of troops. And it would take years, massive recruitment and conscription (the draft) on a large scale to put enough American troops in Iraq to get the levels needed to run a counterinsurgency war effectively.  It's not going to happen.

This BW editorial, Iraq: How to Repair America's Moral Authority 05/24/04, noting that the "fiercest anti-American backlash in history may well be under way," recommends a return to the Powell doctrine:

The Administration strategy of unilateral preemption lies in pieces. In the end, America's attempt to go it alone in Iraq lacked the military resources and international legitimacy to work. A return to the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force, with explicit goals and a clear exit strategy, would be a step in restoring America's legitimacy worldwide. It requires the use of massive military might that only allies can provide. It reintegrates the U.S. into its alliances and assures allies that their voices will be heard.

This editorial also says:

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is associated with such a series of bad management mistakes in Iraq that had he done anything similar as chief executive of a corporation, his board would have fired him. ... [H]e is clearly responsible for designing an occupation policy that is falling apart. Rumsfeld's removal is a necessary first step in reestablishing American credibility in Iraq and the Middle East.

That sounds similar to this recommendation from last week:

We simply cannot afford to further increase the risk to our country with more blunders by this team. Donald Rumsfeld, as the chief architect of the war plan, should resign today. His deputies Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and his intelligence chief Stephen Cambone should also resign. The nation is especially at risk every single day that Rumsfeld remains as Secretary of Defense. - Al Gore, the elected President, 05/26/04.