Halloween's Over But...

...this just strikes me as kind of creepy:

The Republican National Committee Friday asked CBS to allow a team of historians and friends of former President Ronald Reagan and his wife to review a miniseries about the couple before it airs.

As Atrios points out, this is the party that controls the Presidency, both houses of Congress and the Supreme Court - formally pressuring a TV network to let them review the content of an historical drama to insure it meets their partisan political standards.

Tags: authoritarianism, republican party, ronald reagan

Say What?

Democratic Presidential candidate Howard Dean from this past week:

"I still want to be the candidate for guys with Confederate flags in their pickup trucks."

Here's a hint for Dr. Dean: They ain't gone vote for you. Especially the ones who also have a car tag with a little guy in a Confederate uniform holding a Confederate battle flag with the caption, "Forget, hell!"

But in the bipartisan spirit, here's an oldie-but-goodie from 1964 Republican Presidential nominee Barry Goldwater as he was campaigning in Salt Lake City:

"Many Americans don't like simple things.  That is why they are against we conservatives."

Tags: 2004 election, howard dean, noe-confederates

Iraq War Advocates: Richard Perle

Richard Perle, one of Rummy's main advisers and one of the most influential hawks on the Iraq War, was nicknamed by his admirers "the Prince of Darkness." It's kind of scary when the people who admire you give you a nickname like that!

This interview with Perle gives an indication why (my emphasis):

<< The justification [for the Iraq War] was never restricted to weapons of mass destruction. The president talked about regime change very early on. The regime change argument was eclipsed by the weapons of mass destruction argument partly because the Department of State was always uncomfortable talking about regime change… [because] that it is outside what is today the accepted notion of legitimacy in international terms…. But weapons of mass destruction and violations of UN resolutions are a solid basis for reaction and the State Department gravitated toward the legally correct view. >>

 

One would hope that every official employed by the United States Government would "gravitate toward the legally correct view." But apparently not everyone involved thought that was an adequate perspective.

Tags: iraq war, richard perle

Iraq War: The 3I's After Action Report (Pt. 2 of 2)

(Cont. from Part 1) The After Action Report gives some indication of what a challenge the transition to occupation and counterinsurgency has been (my emphasis):

<< The Law of Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention require U.S. forces to protect specific targets such as hospitals, schools, population centers, and religious sites. [Notice that this Army report shows rather more concern for international law than the Secretary of Defense does.] Accurate IPB [intelligence prepartion of the battlefield] is important to identify these sites and adequately protect them.

<< Information about the infrastructure of the AO [area of operations] is critical for planning and prioritizing SASO [Support and Stability Operations]. Restoring any lost services after the cessation of hostilities is critical to establishing and legitimizing coalition control. Knowing the electrical, gas, water, and sewage distribution systems and how they are interconnected is essential to getting them functioning. Often, the facilities are intact, but not operating; knowing what facilities to restart is over half the battle.

<< The IPB must also identify the key locations for restoring a functioning society that will need protection such as banks, government buildings, public records, fire stations, police stations, court houses, jails/prisons and any other location that will have a significant impact on restoring the functions of a city/society. This identification enables commanders to determine risk and to allocate resources. >>

The report observes, "The transition from warfighting to SASO is a huge shift in priorities and focus for the entire division from the soldier in the street up to the division commander. The IPB for this transition needs to begin much earlier than the change itself." A major point of David Rieff's analysis mentioned in an earlier post is that lack of planning for "SASO" as the Army calls it compounded problems that were going to be serious in the best of circumstances.

Tags: iraq war

Iraq War: The 3I's After Action Report (Pt. 1 of 2)

The Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report (.pdf file) I mentioned in a previous post has some good observations about how the lack of preparation for the stabilization/occupation/counterinsurgency phase of the Iraq War affected how badly the occupation started, if you can translate the military jargon (my emphasis):

<< In preparation for SASO [Support and Stability Operations], units should continue to train civil-military operations (CMO) as part of their full spectrum operations training. The use of CMO situational training exercises (STX) training lanes incorporating detailed scenarios supports this home station training effort. The division as a whole did not focus on CMO training prior to the beginning of combat operations, instead focusing on mid intensity [conventional war] operations. Given that there are situations that mandate decentralized execution by our soldiers, a requirement exists to train the soldiers on a variety of scenarios.

<< As the division transitioned to SASO, it did not have sufficient forces or effective rules of engagement (ROE) to control civilian looting and rioting throughout the city [Baghdad]. Looting by the local civilians was a significant obstacle to the reestablishment of order in such a heavily populated area. Units were not able to dedicate resources to stop initial looting due to ongoing combat operations. However, once the enemy situation permitted, companies were able to focus on looting and began to detain and process looting civilians as EPWs [enemy prisoners of war]. The problem quickly diminished to a condition that a local organized "neighborhood watch" [i.e., private armed militias] could control.

<< Looting and rioting are one of the many competing priorities that commanders must plan for early in the transition to SASO. Employment of non-lethal munitions should be planned and resourced to allow a graduated response and minimize civilian casualties. >> (Cont. in Part 2)

Tags: iraq war

Mississippi Politics: Developing Clarke County

This article describes the efforts of my old home county in Mississippi to bring new jobs to the county.

In recent times, Clarke County has been hit hard by plant closings by Burlingame Industries, Sunbeam and Quitman Knitting Mills. The (Jackson MS) Clarion-Ledger article notes, “In September [2003], Clarke County had an unemployment rate of 5.7 percent, a drastic decline from the 19.3 percent that was the state's highest in April 2002.” But I suspect that the September figure understates actual unemployment due to the number of people not actively seeking work at the moment because prospects have been so bad. (They aren’t counted as “unemployed.”)

One of the county supervisors mentioned in the article and featured in the photograph is Cleveland Peebles, an old high-school classmate of mine. They are doing the kind of patient work it takes to attract investment to rural counties like Clarke. And I don't care how often business lobbyists chant the same stale slogans that low taxes and light regulation are the only incentives that count, the reality is that public services count even more. That means decent roads and schools and a workforce educated and skilled enough to fill the jobs that need to be done.

Notice in the article that various government agencies and programs had a role in winning these investments, from the county board of supervisors to the federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. The current Governor Ronnie Musgrove has done a good job of attracting investment to the state. I hardly see how his Republican opponent Haley Barbour, the guy who's made a big point of cozying up to the White Citizens Council and promoting the Confederate state flag, is likely to do better. Or even as well.

If Barbour does win in the election this coming Tuesday, I hope that the state completes the stretch of four-lane on Highway 45 through the town of Shubuta, mentioned in the article as the location of the new investment by Magnolia Spinning LLC. The widening of the highway on the 55-mile section between Meridian and Waynesboro has been underway for about 15 years. If it's not done by the time Barbour takes office, it may never happen!

Tags: clarke county, mississippi politics

Iraq War: Problems in Occupation Described

The current New York Times Magazine has a long article by David Rieff about the genesis of the problems currently facing the occupation in Iraq: Blueprint for a Mess. Much of it is a summary of events that have been previously reported, but it does have some original material, as well. (The NYT has taken to charging for articles more than a week old, so if you want to see it free, do it before next Saturday!)

Rieff summarizes the major problems in six categories, some of which not surprisingly overlap, and each of which he discusses at some length:

1. Over-reliance on exile leader Ahmed Chalabi

2. Shutting the State Department out from practical influence on reconstruction planning

3. Too little planning, too late, for the stablization and reconstruction phase

4. Inadequate numbers of troops without training or orders appropriate to occupation duties

5. Neglecting the official occupation structure authority. This is an especially interesting section of Rieff's article, describing how the "nation-building" authority set up in the Pentagon was neglected in practice by military officers whose active participation was necessary to make it work effectively.

6. Ignoring the Shiites Rieff also cites the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report (.pdf file), which is available online at an Army Web site, even though the document is marked "For Official Use Only." It's often interesting to see how internal Army professional analysts summarizes successes and failures. It's often quite a different approach that those you find in partisan commentaries.

Tags: iraq war