Questions about the Israeli Defense Force

Following up with the subject of my previous post, Juan Cole has a comment (Problems with Israeli Military Performance Informed Comment blog 07/25/06) on the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) surprising problems in the Israel-Lebanon War, at least based on the publicly available information so far:

The Israelis are finding that the Hizbullah guerrillas have excellent intelligence on Israeli weaponry, and that they are capable of fighting orderly tactical battles from buildings with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. In other words, they are not facing the militia of tobacco share croppers. They are facing a highly professional military force, perhaps the most professional in the region aside from Israel's own.

Cole links to this articel:  Now is the time to investigate by Reuven Pedatzur Ha'aretz 07/24/06.

And he comments:

If you read Reuven Pedatzur's article in Haaretz attentively, you will see that he is indicting the Israeli armed forces as incompetent and also will detect that he is extremely alarmed.  Despite his confidence, expressed at the outset, that Israeli military mistakes (primarily grossly underestimating Hizbullah) will not affect the course of the war, he admits that it will cast a shadow over its public reception.  I don't think we can rule out an impact on the course of the war yet.

Pedatzur writes:

Right now, when the fighting is at its peak, it is necessary to deal with the series of failures that have afflicted the Israel Defense Forces. These failings have not only exposed poor soldiering skills, flawed intelligence and officers' arrogance - but may also affect the way the IDF's enemies come to view it, and influence their decision on whether to embark on war in the future, or to launch their missiles against Israel's home front.  ...

.... And because this is a war that is being fought not only by killing enemy fighters and destroying their arms, but is also over impressions and symbols - it is all the more important to make perfectly clear that the IDF is not ignoring the shortcomings, is handling them and learning its lessons. In the meantime, it appears, this is not being done.

It is puzzling that, after an in-depth examination of the events surrounding the abduction of Cpl. Gilad Shalit produced a grave report by Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland - which concluded that the whole affair was an "operational failure" - no one was found responsible for it. Eiland's hint that he "does not think any of the commanders needs to be dismissed, especially since these officers are now participating in fighting in the Gaza Strip," only deepens the sense of unease. After all, once the fighting is over, no one will deal with the failures of the past, and it will be argued that the focus must now be on the future. ...

Senior IDF officers are not accustomed to criticism originating outside the army's ranks, and normally enjoy great immunity from having to take responsibility for their failings.  But there have been too many shortcomings and failures in recent weeks for them to be ignored.  It is possible that this has been a matter of bad luck, but until the incidents are examined seriously by elements external to the IDF, there is an unpleasant feeling of a whitewash operation going on - and concern that something fundamentally bad is going on in the army.  ...

Then there is the case of the Hezbollah position near Avivim.  It is not clear how the planners of the operation to destroy the outpost lacked basic intelligence on Hezbollah's deployment in the area, even though they had been under observation for a long period.  Apparently, it turns out, no one was aware of the tunnels near the outpost, and no one anticipated that the Hezbollah fighters lay in ambush for the IDF force.

After that came the collision of two helicopters over Galilee.  It is still unclear what caused it, but the resemblance to the helicopter disaster of February 1997 is overwhelming.  An investigation over whether the lessons of that accident were ever adopted is vital.

And it should not be forgotten that all this is taking place when the IDF, the most powerful military force in the Middle East, is fighting against a guerrilla force of only several thousand fighters.  (my emphasis)