Iran and Hizbullah

The International Crisis Group has put out an informational and analytical paper that also contains diplomatic suggestions for moving towarrd alleviating armed hostitlities on the Israel-Lebanon border and in Gaza:  Israel/Lebanon/Palestine: Climbing Out of the Abyss 07/25/06

In the section focusing on Hizbullah (pp. 9-16), the ICG authors examine the relationship between Iran and Hizbullah and give quite a bit of attention to the July 12 Hizbullah raid into Israel which touched off the current war between Israel and Lebanon/Hizbullah.  The ICG reports:

At an immediate level, Hizbollah launched its [July 12] operation for the most banal reason of all: because it could. There was, in this, very little that was new. Hizbollah had alled 2006 “the year of retrieving the prisoners”, and, for many months, Hassan Nasrallah had publicly proclaimed the movement’s intention of seizing soldiers for the purpose of a prisoner exchange. In November 2005, he spoke of the “duty to capture Israeli soldiers and swap them for the Arab prisoners in Israel” and, in April 2006, he had threatened to get back the most notorious, Samir Kuntar, even by force; a previous prisoner exchange in 2004 had not included Kuntar because Hizbollah was unable to provide information on Ron Arad, an Israeli soldier who went missing in action [in Oct 1986].  For some time Israeli officials had been warning that the Islamist movement would try to carry out such an operation. And, indeed, there had been several attempts in the past – eleven according to Nabih Berri, the speaker of parliament – of which the best known took place in November 2005 and was foiled by Israel.  Speculation that the attack was timed to coincide with Iran’s rejection of the nuclear deal appears, in this light, questionable.

The IGC version suggests that Hizbullah had no particular reason to expect the kind of response to the July 12 raid that Isreal actually unleashed:

The conflagration began with what, from Hizbollah’s perspective, was just another in a history of bloody tit-for-tats, many instances of which go unreported.  It was, to be sure, more audacious and provocative, in that it occurred not in the contested Shebaa but in a non-contested area to the West, where Israeli vigilance was far lower, but not fundamentally different in its objectives.  As their leaders saw it, it would provoke another round of fighting, intense perhaps but contained, and revert to the traditional paradigm of prisoner swaps.

The report includes a long footnote about the denials from Hizbullah that their July 12 action was connected with the Iranian nuclear negotiations:

Hizbollah officials claim otherwise, arguing that Iran had nothing to do with it and, indeed, stood to lose. According to Hussein el Hajj Hassan, a Hizbollah parliamentarian, Iran provides money, but not political direction. “ Iran has no interest in pushing Hizbollah toward a confrontation that could any prior information….I had not consulted anyone of them. Regarding the Iranian issue, if a war takes place in Lebanon, a war will come to an end in one, two, or three months. How long would a war take? A war will eventually come to an end.  What will this change in the Iranian nuclear file? On the contrary, I tell you that if there is a relationship with the Iranian nuclear file, the current war on Lebanon is not in the interest of the Iranian nuclear file. The Americans and Israelis have always taken into account that if a confrontation takes place with Iran, Hizbollah might interfere in Iran’s interest. If Hizbollah is hit now, what does this mean? This means that Iran is weakened in its nuclear file, not strengthened”. Hassan Nasrallah interview, Al-Jazeera television, 21 July 2006. A senior Iranian official agreed: “It is idiotic to think that Iran was behind these attacks in order to divert attention from the nuclear case. It is only going to increase attention to our nuclear case. And the ensuing chaos is Lebanon is detrimental in our interests”. Crisis Group telephone interview, 21 July 2006. Likewise on Syria, Nasrallah noted: “Does anybody believe that a confrontation of this kind will  cancel the international tribunal decision [concerning Rafiq al-Hariri’s murder] if there is an international will to establish an international tribunal?” He concluded: “Are we that crazy that I and my brothers want to sacrifice our souls, our families, our honourable masses and our dear ones in order to have Syria return to Lebanon, or to postpone the international tribunal, or for the sake of the Iranian nuclear file!...This is an insult”. Al-Jazeera interview.

Still, the IGC report stresses the involvement of Hizbullah with Iran and Syria:

Nor should one underestimate the regional angle.  Although there is no evidence that either Syria or Iran directly ordered the attack – and, operationally, considerable doubt that they could do so – it is difficult to imagine it taking place over their objections. The timing was, in this sense, wholly consistent with the mindset in both countries which, each for its own reason but both because they were under pressure, thought they might benefit from reminding the world of their more than nuisance capacity. More to the point, it fit in with a more aggressive Iranian posture that is seeking to assert itself regionally.  (my emphasis)

IGC describes the group this way:

At bottom, Hizbollah is a Shiite movement, indeed the Shiites’ prime organisational asset in a country long reserved primarily for Christian and Sunni Muslim interests.  It is also a national movement, intent on demonstrating cross-confessional appeal as the only effective defender of the country’s security, but it also possesses, critically, a regional identity, being closely tied to and, in some respects, dependent on Syria and Iran.  In a sense, Hizbollah is revolutionary Iran’s proudest achievement, the result of a two-decade long, billions of dollars investment. And it is an intensely ideological movement, holding to a revolutionary, internationalist Islamist creed, intent since Israel’s 2000 withdrawal on expanding its role to the Palestinian arena, all of which made one Lebanese commentator dub it “Islamism’s Trostkyites”[sic].  Hizbollah’s success stems from its remarkable ability to take advantage of the country’s political system and its tragic civil war to give a pan-Islamist revolutionary idea Lebanese roots.

"Islamism's Trotskyites":  I haven't heard that one before.

The IGC explains that because of various internal political considerations in Lebanon and expternal pressures, among the latter the Bush/neocon talk of reshaping the Middle East, Hizbullah has recently presented a confusing picture:

The result is a flurry of apparent contradictions.  Hizbollah gradually has been evolving toward a more mundane political organisation, and justification for its weapons ring increasingly hollow; yet its leaders cling to the dominant paradigm of “resistance” (muqawama).   The movement has joined the government and is ever more present inthe political system;yet, at the same time, it increasingly perceives that system as tainted from the inside, as several of its actors side with the external enemy.  More and more, Hizbollah is viewed as a sectarian organisation partaking in the banal apportionment of resources along confessional lines; yet it remains determined to maintain its image as a national movement and is as committed as ever to its revolutionary agenda.   And while the confrontation with Israel had become more muted, it considered the dangers for the region were becoming greater.  Whatever reasons existed for Hizbollah to transition toward a purely political party, more than enough reasons were pushing it the other way.

From 26 Hezbollah gunmen killed by IDF in Bint Jbail clashes By Ze'ev Schiff and Amos Harel Ha'aretz 07/29/06

The heads of two Israeli intelligence agencies disagree over how much the Israel Defense Forces assault has damaged Hezbollah, although both say the group has been weakened.

The Mossad intelligence agency says Hezbollah will be able to continue fighting at the current level for a long time to come, Mossad head Meir Dagan said.

However, Military Intelligence chief Amos Yadlin disagrees, seeing Hezbollah as having been severely damaged.

The IDF believes that at least 200 Hezbollah operatives have been killed since the fighting began more than two weeks ago, a military source said Friday.

Both intelligence chiefs agree that Hezbollah remains capable of command and control and still holds long-range missiles in its arsenal, they said at a security cabinet meeting Thursday.

This article provides some accounts of Hizbullah fighting style on the ground:  Wounded troops describe Bint Jbail battle as 'hell on earth' by Nir Hasson and Tomer Levi Ha'aretz 07/27/06.

The wounded soldiers described the battle as a bitter one which took place in a built-up setting, one where enemy forces had organized a well-planned ambush. Soldiers faced gunfire from any and all directions.

"They shot at us from 180 degrees," said one of the soldiers. Most of the dead and seriously wounded are those from the initial wave of ground troops which tried to enter one of thehomes in Bint Jbail.The soldiers who suffered light wounds are primarily those who arrived on the scene to retrieve the bodies of the dead and wounded soldiers lying in the battlefield. ...

One of Hezbollah's most troublesome position from which it fired upon soldiers was the towering mosque in the village.

"There were maybe 30 terrorists [in the mosque]," Shalom said.

Staff Sergeant Avraham Dajan was hit in his arm by shrapnel. "They fired from all directions, we tried to get to the wounded," he said. "As I was about to throw a grenade, I got hit by shrapnel. After I was hurt, I couldn't do anything. I saved myself."

Some of the wounded soldiers spoke of face-to-face clashes with Hezbollah operatives. However, none of the soldiers gave first-hand accounts of such incidents. The soldiers, who serve in the 51st battalion of the Golani infantry brigades, said their stay in Lebanon extended to three consecutive days, during which they managed very little sleep.

In an earlier post today at The Blue Voice, I referenced some other articles about Hizbullah.  And I also quoted from Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods (2004) by John Poole, who writes that Lebanese Hizbullah stresses martyrdom in training new fighters. "This may increase their willingness to engage in close combat".

He reports that by the latter half of the 1990s, Hizbullah had become especially skilled in using human intelligence to target enemy forces. Some of the information may have come from symapthizers in the Lebanese Army, but the group "depended mostly for real-time intelligence on the local population and long-range observation". And he writes:

More often than not, Hezbollah guerrillas would take IDF [Israeli Defense Force] units under fire with small arms or antitank missiles from a populated area. They did so to draw enough return fire to alienate the local population. To evoke a full Israeli response, the Islamic guerrillas would lob a few Katyusyha rockets into their border settlements. In essence, the guerrillas had learned to turn their foe's mindset against him.  (my emphasis)

In an observation that seems very relevant to what little we know of the IDF's experience on the ground in Lebanon the last two weeks, Poole writesthat the villages in southern Lebanon could:

... closely resemble the Vietnamese border hamlets into which 17 fully supported Chinese divisions could only penetrate 30 miles in 1979. Those hamlets were being manned by local militiamen too, as all the Vietnamese regulars were off fighting the Khymer Rouge in Cambodia. If those Lebanese villages had also been linked by tunnel, they would constitute a "soft, underground strongpoint defense" - the state of the art in rural defense. Any intruder risks surprise fire from every direction.  (my emphasis)

He quotes a 1997 report in the Financial Times saying, "Inside the zone [southern Lebanon] itself, the IDF is often pinned down in fixed positions, and no amount of air superiority can compensate for this weakness on the ground."

Poole says of Hizbollah's military methods, including some involving terrorist tactics:

While sneaky and immoral, it was nevertheless very effective. After 20 years of refinement in Lebanon, it had become a unique blend of Shiite martyrdom, high explosives, and guerrilla tactics. Because it spilled over into politics, media, religion, and psychology, it qualified as "4th-generation" warfare. Concurrently being developed (in large part by Sunnis) in Afghanistan and Chechnya was a similar approach.