Wondering about "fourth-generation warfare"?

"Nontrinitarian war is, therefore, nothing more than the negation of a misunderstanding."

Hegel lecturing on the processes of history? Ludwig Fuerbach discussing medieval theological disputes?  Some obscure Marxist making some obscure Marxist point?

No, it's from a paper from one of the most respected writers on military strategy.

This paper by Antulio Echevarria II on Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths (Nov 2005; US Army Strategic Studies Institute) challenges some the theoretical assumptions of the advocates of the "fourth-generation war" (4GW) framework for understanding contemporary military challenges.

4GW is a theory that is in part a critique of the dominant assumptions of the "network-centric" approach to integrating current technology with soldiers on the battlefield, which is the basis of the current effort at military "transformation".

One of the reasons the paper is interesting is that it is a reminder of the near-theologically obscure concepts that military strategists use in debating such concepts.  Buzzwords like "transformation" sometimes show up briefly in the popular press.  But in papers like this, it's typical to frame everything in terms of its implications for military "transformation" because that is the official framework right now.

But 4GW doesn't pop up in the press nearly so often.  And how about the notion of "nontrinitarian war"?  Talk about theological!  Echevarria paper provides the service of defining some of these things more carefully.  He credits the 4GW theorists for trying to move beyond the conventional-war framework and come to grips with the current challenges of globalization and the related transnational terrorism.

But he argues that, from the start, 4GW "blended a maneuver-theorist's misunderstanding of the nature of terrorism with a futurist's infatuation with 'high technology'." And he writes:

To be sure, the concept rightly takes issue with the networkcentric vision of future warfare for being too focused on technology and for overlooking the countermeasures an intelligent, adaptive enemy might employ. However, the model of 4GW has serious problemsof its own: it is based on poor history and only obscures what other historians, theorists, and analysts already have worked long and hard to clarify. Some 4GW proponents, such as Colonel Thomas Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone, see the theory as little more than a vehicle, a tool, to generate a vital dialogue aimed at correcting deficiencies in U.S. military doctrine, training, and organization. For his part, Hammes is to be commended for his willingness to roll up his sleeves and do the hard work necessary to promote positive change. However, the tool that he employs undermines his credibility.

Though not written for a general audience, it's certainly accessable enough to us non-specialists that it gives an idea of the nature of the disputes in this area.  Also, you can learn what "nontrinitarian" means from the paper. But you might be left speculating on who a "negation of a misunderstanding" happens.