Iraq War: International Crisis Group report

"[I]t goes pretty well if you watch it on FOX."
      -  Rev. Jerry Falwell on the Iraq War, 12/02/04.

This report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) got some press attention when it came out last month: What Can the U.S. Do in Iraq? 12/22/04 (*.pdf file).  The main ICG Web site is at www.icg.org.

In Iraq, the U.S. is engaged in a war it already may have lost while losing sight of a struggle in which it still may have time to prevail. Its initial objective was to turn Iraq into a model for the region: a democratic, secular and free-market oriented government, sympathetic to U.S. interests, not openly hostile toward Israel, and possibly home to long-term American military bases. But hostility toward the U.S. and suspicion of its intentions among large numbers of Iraqis have progressed so far that this is virtually out of reach. More than that, the pursuit has become an obstacle to realisation of the most essential, achievable goal -- a stable government viewed by its people as credible, representative and the embodiment of national interests as well as capable of addressing their basic needs.

Of all the many changes that have affected popular attitudes since the fall of the Baathist regime, perhapsthe most notable has been the precipitous drop in confidence in the U.S. This did not occur in a vacuum.  The antecedents of America's troubled relationship with the Iraqi people, which predate Operation Iraqi Freedom, have roots in Washington's ambiguous policies of the 1980s -- marked by a pro-Saddam tilt during the Iran-Iraq war, including the provision of intelligence and weapons;5 its decision not to help the insurgents it previously had encouraged in 1991, and the imposition over a thirteen-year period of draconian sanctions that hurt the people far more than the regime.

There's no evidence so far that the policymakers in the Bush administration are applying a "reality-based" approach to the Iraq War.  But there is awealth of information out there now, including the ICG report, that give a morepragmatic view of the US dilemma in Iraq.

The ICG report also observes what many other analysts have, as well:

While conditions under which the war is waged have fundamentally changed, the U.S. measurements for success have not. The yardsticks -- adherence to the formal political timetable; number of Iraqis recruited and insurgents killed; reconquest of "enemy" territory; political orientation of the new government -- are largely unconnected to the stakes of the current battle and by no means indicative of its trajectory. Of course, material improvements, new schools, increased electricity services and the like are steps in the right direction. But for the most part the successes that are extolled reflect ephemeral victories, short-term advances masking longer-term setbacks and that, at a minimum, are not carrying the U.S. significantly closer to its stated objectives.