"I think we are winning. Okay? I think we're definitely winning. I think we've been winning for some time." - Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Iraq War 04/26/05
"I just wonder if they will ever tell us the truth." - Harold Casey, Louisville, KY, October 2004.
The reliability of official claims from the White House, the Pentagon and various loyal Republican outlets like FOX News concerning the size and preparedness of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) has now effectively reached zero. Anthony Cordesman, who has been following the development of the ISF througout the war, has a new evaluation out: Iraq: Milestones, Benchmarks, and Real World Options 10/30/06.
As Cordesman writes, "To put it bluntly, US reporting on Iraqi force development has lost credibility." And it's clear in the context that he means has essentially lost all credibility. He continues:
Nothing about Iraqi performance in the field indicates that the army, security forces, and police are “75% complete” [as the Pentagon claims]. There is no reason to believe Iraqi force development can be effective in 12 to 18 months without massive Iraqi success in reaching a political compromise that sharply reduces the demands for Iraqi effectiveness and the unity of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) in dealing with insurgents, militias, and death squads.
This means that there is no early prospect for US forces to "stand down". In fact, an increase to an official level of US troops of 150,000 was just announced. (I discuss Cordesman's paper more in a post at The Blue Voice.)
Pat Lang may be a little hazy on the prehistory of the American Confederacy. And maybe a bit stuck in some of the "culture wars" of the Vietnam War days. But he's an expert in military analysis and the Middle East, and also knows Arabic. Here's what he recently reported (“The Sword that Cuts the Arteries of the Infidels" Sic Semper Tyrannis 2006 blog 10/30/06:
From talking to people involved, I perceive that "planning guidance" from our national leadership to the military focuses altogether on excluding any thought that there is a possible outcome other than a complete victory in Iraq, "victory" being defined as complete achievement of President Bush's goals in that country and in the region.Planning guidance like that effectively prevents contingency planning for future events that would be severe reverses. An interruption of the lines of supply would be such a reverse. A hostile entry into combat of one or more of the Shia factions would be another.
Given the current mentality of the civilian government and consequently of the military command in Iraq, I would bet a lot of my own money that there are no serious and detailed plans anywhere in the command structure designed to cope with a massive and adverse series of events in Iraq.
If I'm understanding this correctly, the Cheney-Bush administration has forbidden the military to even plan for the eventuality of a forced retreat.
Yet William Lind - whose perspective on domestic politics I'd rather not think about but who also is an expert and perceptive military analyst, with a good record on his Iraq War commentary - warns that a forced retreat is a real possibility (Third and Final Act Antiwar.com 10/31/06). Referring specifically to the implications of an American attack on Iran, he writes:
What I fear no one foresees is a substantial danger that we could lose the army now deployed in Iraq. ...The danger arises because almost all of the vast quantities of supplies American armies need come into Iraq from one direction, up from Kuwait and other Gulfports in the south. If that supply line is cut, our forces may not have enough stuff, especially fuel, to get out of Iraq. American armies are incredibly fuel-thirsty, and though Iraq has vast oil reserves, it is short of refined oil products. Unlike Guderian's Panzer army on its way to the Channel coast in 1940, we could not just fuel up at local gas stations.
There are two ways our supply lines from the south could be cut if we attack Iran. The first is by Shi'ite militias including the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades, possibly supported by a general Shi'ite uprising and, of course, Iran's Revolutionary Guards (the same guys who trained Hezbollah so well).
The second danger is that regular Iranian Army divisions will roll into Iraq, cut our supply lines, and attempt to pocket us in and around Baghdad. Washington relies on American air power to prevent this, but bad weather can shut most of that air power down.
Unfortunately, no one in Washington and few people in the U.S. military will even consider this possibility. Why? Because we have fallen victim to our own propaganda. Over and over the U.S. military tells itself, "We're the greatest! We're number one! No one can defeat us. No one can even fight us. We're the greatest military in all of history!"
Even without an attack on Iran, Spencer Ackerman in War in Iraq, 2003-?? American Prospect 11/10/06 issue (accessed 11/01/06) looks at the implications of the building of permanent bases in Iraq, a badly underreported aspect of the US intervention:
For years, the Bush administration has refused to discuss how long the United States will stay in Iraq. More recently, the administration speaks of both a “long war” and just-over-the-horizon troop reductions simultaneously - although last month General John Abizaid, the U.S. commander for Middle East and Southeast Asia, ruled out a draw down until next year - with the emphasis shifting depending on the president’s audience and the political moment. On the rare occasions when officials have been pressed, usually in congressional hearings that garner little attention, Bush aides insist there are “no plans” to build permanent bases, a nondenial-denial that focuses attention on unprovable administration intent. But beyond intent is actual construction. That is, the U.S. military has awarded contracts to erect enduring bases at Baghdad, the capital; Balad, in the Sunni center-west; Tallil, in the Shiite center-south; and near Rawah, on the western border with Syria. All this construction is being done not because of any master plan, but in the absence of it. To put it another way, the military has to take steps for a permanent presence in Iraq in order to be responsible - since no one has instructed commanders about when they will leave.
"Wars are easy to get into, but hard as hell to get out of." - George McGovern and Jim McGovern 06/06/05
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