"I think we are winning. Okay? I think we're definitely winning. I think we've been winning for some time." - Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Iraq War 04/26/05
"I just wonder if they will ever tell us the truth." - Harold Casey, Louisville, KY, October 2004.
Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Security and International Studies (CSIS) did an analysis of Bush's June 28 speech on Iraq the next day: The President's Speech on Iraq: Truth vs. Spin 06/29/05 (*.pdf file).
One of the factors that Cordesman (who was recently in Iraq himself) has been following closely is the preparedness of Iraqi security forces. Bush's reassuring-sounding comments on that were highly misleading:
[T]he entire force building effort is just beginning to acquire critical mass, and it will require at least another year of intense US military support in combat. The President was right in saying that there are more than 160,000 trained and equipped Iraqi security forces, almost all of which are capable of performing at least low-level missions.
This is a major rise in such manpower from a totals of around 96,000 in August 2004, and Iraqi forces will be able to take over more and more of the mission with time.
However, the President did not mention that US plans also call for expanding the Iraqi manpower pool through July 2006, and from 168,000 men in June 2005, to 200,000 in September, 230,000 in December, and 270,000 in July 2006, and just how much further the force building effort must go.
The President did not talk about the time it will take to develop actual combat capability, Moreover, it will take a substantial amount of time to bring most Iraqi manpower from little or limited operational capability to fully operational capability.
We always need to keep in mind with these numbers that Saddam's army and Republican Guard numbered around 500,000, excluding local police. The administration's number on "security personnel" routinely combined army and police figures, which are also the "security forces" figures that Cordesman cites here.
Cordesman repots, "The Iraqi Army and National Guard, security services, and police are now being rated by a new evaluation matrix developed by the MNSTC-I. [The Iraqi Army, Ministry of Defense and the Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq]" Although the rating system itself is classified, Cordesman tells us about some of the leaked results. Out of 81 army and National Guard batallions as of this May, only three were found "at the top level of readiness and capability, and this did not mean they were capable of independent operations." (my emphasis)
The new rating system found that Iraqi units were particularly weak in logistics; because they were being rushed into combat readiness, and lacked support personnel like truck drivers, supply clerks, medics and engineers. Instead of the nearly 50-50 tooth-to-tail ratio in US forces, only 4,000 of the 75,800 men in rated units were performing a support function.
Cordesman also cautions his readers not be be confused about the implications of even the most optimistic possibilities for current Bush administration plans in one regard (my emphasis):
The President implied the US had plans to totally leave Iraq once current plans are complete. It doesn't. Plans don't yet exist to give Iraq all the armor, artillery, airpower,and support it will need until the insurgency is truly defeated.
Cordesman in the following paragraph is wording things very diplomatically. But he's pointing out the fact that the current "military transformation" was focused on substituting air power for infantry, and that the kind of training involved was the kind needed for fighting the Soviet Army Central pouring through the Fulda Gap in Germany, not the kind for fighting Muslim guerrillas in Southwest Asia (my emphasis):
The President also gave a dangerously over-simplified rationale for not deploying more American troops, although he was honest in stating that foreign forces are resented by Iraqis, not seen as "liberators," and only Iraqi forces can lead to the kind of popular acceptance that can defeat the insurgency. The truth is we don't have large reserves of the kind of trained forces with the combat and area skills that are needed. The US has the same problems with force quality versus force quantity as Iraqis, and our present force structure must be changed to avoid overdeploying the skilled actives and reserves that had largely already been in Iraq. Six years of near failure in effective force transformation have compounded the problem.
He found Bush's speech deficient in other aspects, as well:
* Overemphasized foreign fighters
* Provided a Pollyanna view of the political accomplishments to date in Iraq
* Talked superficially about democracy as an easy solution to US problems in the Middle East
* Painted misleading picture of our so-called "coalition."
* Gave a description of Iraq's economic state that was "meaningless and misleading".
And he concludes (my emphasis):
In short, this was not the honest speech that Americans needed to hear; it was dominated by efforts at spin control. It did not explain the sacrifices needed, or the risks to be faced. It provided a partial and largely misleading explanation for the US role in Iraq, without mention of our moral and ethical obligation to the Iraqi people and the vital strategic interests involved. Instead of "blood, sweat, and tears," we got spin, risk avoidance, and promises without cost. Normal perhaps by today's political standards, but scarcely the kind of realism and leadership that will inspire the continuing American support that US forces, Iraq, and our allies will need during the difficult and uncertain years to come.
As Ron Hutcheson recently reported, Anthony Cordesman is a supporter of the Bush policy in the broad sense of keeping American troops in Iraq until the Iraqi forces can successfully defeat the counterinsurgency. It's just that he's trying to be a realist about what it will really take. He also has a professional reputation as a military analyst that he presumably doesn't want to squander by pimping for phony administration propaganda claims about the war.
"Wars are easy to get into, but hard as hell to get out of." - George McGovern and Jim McGovern 06/06/05
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